

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

PUBLIC HEARING ON THE DRAFT PANTEX

SITE-WIDE ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT

STATEMENT

COMMENTS ON SWEIS FOR CONTINUED OPERATION OF
PANTEX PLANT AND ASSOCIATED STORAGE OF
NUCLEAR WEAPONS COMPONENTS

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ALBUQUERQUE, NEW MEXICO

ON MAY 7, 1996
3:00 PM AND 6:00 PM

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6121 Indian School Road N.E., Suite 205
Albuquerque, NM 87110
Telephone (505) 881-3188
FAX (505) 881-3283

17 May 1996

Dear Recipient,

Enclosed are public hearing transcripts associated with the Draft Pantex Site-Wide Environmental Impact Statement (EIS). We will be continuing to send you transcripts from multiple sites as we receive them. Place them in your reading room with your Pantex DEIS.

If for whatever reason you have not received a copy of the DEIS, notify us and we will send you one.

Sincerely,

Rachael E. Pitts
Librarian

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY



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OPERATOR
DONALD
S. Proje
AS, Manager
Office

COMMENTS ON SWEIS FOR
CONTINUED OPERATION
OF PANTEX PLANT AND
ASSOCIATED STORAGE OF
NUCLEAR WEAPONS COMPONENTS

Assistant Manager, EEM
Albuquerque, New Mexico

PUBLIC HEARING
ON THE
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT
ALBUQUERQUE CONVENTION CENTER
ENCHANTMENT ROOM
ALBUQUERQUE, NEW MEXICO

May 7, 1996
3:00 PM



DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

PAINTER PLANT

PUBLIC HEARING

ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT

SITE-WIDE

DOE

ENV

DOE

Comments on the Environmental Impact Statement for the Painter Plant and Associated Storage of Nuclear Weapons Components

Comments on the Site-Wide Environmental Impact Statement for the Painter Plant and Associated Storage of Nuclear Weapons Components

COMMENTS ON THE ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT FOR THE PAINTER PLANT AND ASSOCIATED STORAGE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS COMPONENTS

Richard [unclear]
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A P P E A R A N C E S

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MODERATOR:

MS. DONNA A. BERGMAN, Manager
EIS Projects Office
U.S. Department of Energy
Albuquerque Operations Office

SPEAKER:

MS. NANETTE D. FOUNDS
Assistant Manager, DOE
Albuquerque, New Mexico



U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

COMMENTS ON BASIS FOR
CONTINUED OPERATION
OF BARTX PLANT AND
ASSOCIATED STORAGE OF
NUCLEAR WEAPONS COMPONENTS

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1 MS. BERGMAN: As I mentioned, this is the
2 only mike we have, and I want to make sure that we get
3 all your comments, so I would appreciate -- and I
4 don't even have a stand for this. I am the stand.
5 This is as far as I can go with it, so if you have any
6 comments, I'd appreciate it if you can come up here,
7 or if you are more comfortable doing it from there, I
8 am just a little bit concerned we won't be able to
9 pick you up clearly, so I'd appreciate it if you come
10 up here.

11 At this time, I would like to open it up for
12 questions or comments. This workshop goes to 5:00,
13 and we are repeating it tonight from 6:00 to 9:00.

14 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: The Department of
15 Defense is a cooperating agency in this EIS, so I am
16 interested in knowing what DOD people are here today
17 who might be able to answer some questions. Are there
18 any Department of Defense officials here, and if he
19 could give us a little background in terms of what his
20 job is, I have lots of questions, and some of them may
21 be more appropriate than others.

22 MR. MARTIN: I am Major Dave Martin, and I
23 am the Department of Defense representative. I am the
24 Deputy Director of Environmental Management at
25 Kirtland Air Force Base. When Department of Energy

TRANSCRIPT

20

JOHN A. BROWN, Manager
Project Office
Department of Energy
Industrial Operations Office

SPEAKER:

MR. HANSTON D. BROWN
Assistant Manager, DOE
Albuquerque, New Mexico

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1 approached Kirtland and said this was something that
2 they were looking at and were proposing, the sitewide
3 EIS and the process that goes along with it, I was
4 nominated by the base to be the base spokesman.

5 What we have done so far is per the
6 direction of the Department of the Air Force and
7 delegating that down to Air Force Material Command,
8 which is our headquarters in Dayton, Ohio, they said
9 that we are authorized to participate in the study,
10 i.e., answer the questions the Department of Energy
11 has concerning capabilities, good points, bad points,
12 et cetera, at Kirtland Air Force Base and how they
13 apply to the needs of the Department of Energy.

14 Do you have a question for me?

15 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Were there other
16 Department of Defense sites that were assessed in this
17 EIS?

18 MS. FOUNDS: No, there were no other
19 Department of Defense sites that were assessed in
20 terms of the EIS.

21 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Is there a reason for
22 that?

23 MS. FOUNDS: We went through a selection
24 process, and as part of that, we sent our selection
25 process over to the Department of Defense, they

1 evaluated that and recommended essentially two sites
2 to us, that being Seneca Army Depot and also Kirtland
3 Air Force Base. The Air Force responded that they
4 would become a cooperating agency, and at the time,
5 Seneca was going through part of the process. As part
6 of that process, they were selected for closure and
7 are in the process of disposing of the base.

8 The Department of Energy could not say that
9 they would absolutely use that site. We needed to do
10 this EIS because of that, and we responded that there
11 were other sites that we had that would fulfill the
12 missions for this particular -- for the storage and as
13 such did not consider Seneca Army Depot as part of
14 that. In our EIS, it does go through, and it explains
15 the process that we used.

16 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: I have a number of
17 questions that I hope the major can answer or maybe
18 Nan, and it relates to part of chapter 5 of the
19 document, which is the basic environmental analysis
20 about Kirtland. Let me just go through a few things,
21 and any time anybody else wants to jump in and ask a
22 lot of questions, please feel free. I don't
23 necessarily need to monopolize time.

24 I guess I want to understand a couple of
25 things. The document talks about the 120-odd bunkers

1 and, then it talks about the 41 that are actually in
2 the mountain, and on 555, it says that more than 30 of
3 these 41 magazines have a minimum overburden of 9
4 meters, and 6 pages later, it says 35, so I just first
5 want to get some clarification about the bunkers that
6 we are talking about.

7 How many are there, and is the position --
8 and Nan may be able to answer this as well as the
9 major, is the position that if storage happened at
10 Manzano, only the bunkers with at least the minimum
11 9-meter overburden would be used?

12 MS. FOUNDS: Yes, I believe that that is the
13 overburden that we considered for the accident
14 analysis, so we are really looking at putting those
15 within that area.

16 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: So how many of the 41
17 actually meet that standard?

18 MS. FOUNDS: I believe it is 35, but I can
19 check on that. Cliff, can you --

20 MR. JARMAN: I'd have to check.

21 MS. FOUNDS: It was my understanding that it
22 was 35.

23 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: In my reading of the
24 documents, I am unclear.

25 MS. FOUNDS: We will take that and look at

1 those.

2 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: The document also
3 says that construction began June, '47, and became
4 operational in April of '50, so that would essentially
5 say that the bunkers we are talking about are more
6 than 45 years old. My specific question is what is
7 the design life of those bunkers?

8 MS. FOUNDS: What we did was, and I can let
9 you answer this question, but we looked at that in
10 terms of looking at the designs of the facilities, and
11 we felt that it was adequate for the storage of those
12 facilities. There may have to be some upgrades that
13 go along with that and inspections of those facilities
14 prior to becoming operational for this activity.

15 MR. MARTIN: Just to amplify a little bit
16 what Nan said, when they came to us with questions,
17 what we did was we identified to them that these
18 bunkers are not -- they are 45-plus years old. Some
19 are perfect. There are some upgrades, some rework
20 that is going to have to be done. As far as an
21 absolute, this is the design of them, and I have seen
22 nothing to indicate that.

23 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: I have a question
24 related to Don's question. In the EIS, it doesn't
25 show that there are the three faults that go through

1 this stupid mountain, and yet, it is well documented
2 on many geologic reports that there are three major
3 faults that go through the Manzano weapons storage
4 facility.

5 My question, as is Don's, is if these
6 facilities are 45 years old, they obviously were not
7 built with the current technological skills that go
8 along with earthquake-type design. To me, that is a
9 major concern. Also, my concern is -- I love it. You
10 guys always put the stuff on the east side of the
11 mountain so it goes to the Manzanos. We really object
12 to that heartily, you guys. Put it in Four Hills.

13 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Were you going to add
14 some more?

15 MS. FOUNDS: Go ahead.

16 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: I guess that the
17 design question is an important one, I think from a
18 variety of standpoints, so my request would be that we
19 get some more detailed design and engineering analysis
20 of the bunkers in terms of design life, design
21 capability. The major had said some of them need to
22 be upgraded. It seems to me we need to have more
23 specific information on those things.

24 I didn't see any references in the document
25 that give me that kind of detail, so if I have missed

1 it, I'd like somebody to tell me if there is a
2 document that describes it. I'd like to know what it
3 is. If there isn't a document that describes it, I'd
4 like to know how that information is going to be
5 presented.

6 MS. FOUNDS: We can certainly look at the
7 additional information or information that we think we
8 could get ahold of. The one thing I'd like to point
9 out is that the AT-400 is a fairly substantial
10 container, it is a certified shipping container, and
11 that is what these pits would be put in. When you
12 talk about an earthquake environment, the earthquake
13 probabilities and things like that are still fairly
14 low for this area, and I will let Cliff go over that
15 in greater detail.

16 The other thing is that if you have an
17 earthquake out there, and you have the mountain come
18 down, essentially, you have a very nice sealed area
19 and probably would not have a release of plutonium
20 under those kinds of conditions.

21 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Have any cost
22 estimates been done on the required rework?

23 MS. FOUNDS: No, they have not, and that has
24 been identified that we need to be doing some cost
25 estimates, but it has not been done at this point.

1 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: I am interested in
2 knowing, since there are 41 identified bunkers in the
3 mountain, and 20 or so, up to 25 could be used if all
4 20,000 pits would come, what is the present and
5 continuing mission for the other nearby bunkers? What
6 would be in them? What would happen to them? What
7 effect does storing pits have on those bunkers? What
8 might be in the other bunkers that could affect the
9 mountain and the pit storage?

10 MR. MARTIN: The bunkers -- all different
11 types of bunkers at Manzano are currently being used
12 by a number of different groups. For example, the
13 Department of Energy, Sandia National Laboratories has
14 some bunkers. We have some bunkers that are under the
15 control of Phillips Laboratory. We have some, as I
16 recall, that are Los Alamos National Laboratory's.
17 There are numbers of people who are using the bunkers
18 right now who are using them where their presence is
19 allowed.

20 One of the things that we identified in the
21 process was the issue of compatibility. If a decision
22 is made that pits are going to, in fact, be stored at
23 Manzano, we need to look at the relocation of the
24 current tenants. We need to look at what they have
25 got in there, and there are any number of things, and

1 there are some operational activities that are going
2 on there right now by Phillips Laboratory.

3 You would have to actually talk to Phillips
4 Laboratory for that type of information, but it is a
5 real concern about where would the current tenants go
6 to? What are their actual requirements? There also
7 are concerns about what sort of buffer zones would be
8 required from the bunkers and so forth, and those are
9 all questions that are going to have to be answered in
10 the future.

11 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Are they going to be
12 answered in the context of between now and the time of
13 the final EIS?

14 MS. FOUNDS: In terms of that, that would
15 have to be if the Department decides to relocate these
16 things to the Kirtland Air Force Base, then the
17 negotiations would have to begin, and memorandums
18 would have to be written in order to co-locate these
19 with other activities that are on the mountain. That
20 would be worked out once the decision at headquarters
21 was decided that we wanted to place it in the Manzano
22 Mountains. There are a lot of operational concerns
23 that would have to be worked out at that time.

24 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Since you brought up
25 the memorandum of understanding or agreement, let me

1 ask a couple of questions about it. The document
2 doesn't seem to make clear whether if Manzano was
3 used, they would be under DOD or DOE control.

4 MS. FOUNDS: They would be under DOE
5 control.

6 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: So the memorandum of
7 agreement would be between DOE and who?

8 MS. FOUNDS: DOD.

9 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: DOD or the Air Force?

10 MS. FOUNDS: It would have to be through
11 DOD, and it would also have to be with the Air Force
12 Material Command. They are actually the cooperating
13 agency in this action, the Air Force Material Command,
14 because they are the ones that possess the base or own
15 title to it or whatever you wish to call that, so it
16 would have to be through the DOD and through the Air
17 Force Material Command.

18 If there is anyone else who wants to ask a
19 question, please raise your hand, and we will be happy
20 to turn the floor over to you and then turn back to
21 Mr. Hancock.

22 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Let me ask a couple
23 more questions, then there may be a natural break for
24 folks to come in. I'd be very interested, and Ann has
25 already mentioned the earthquake issue. Another thing

1 is the water and the springs in the mountain. Dry as
2 it seems all around here, particularly when we don't
3 have any rain, there is actually water in the
4 mountain. There is an intriguing sentence on page
5 5-59 in the document that says some magazines show
6 evidence of water intrusion.

7 I am interested in knowing to what extent
8 the water intrusion affects any of the 41 in the
9 mountain and how many of the ones that potentially --
10 well, let's start with that. How many of the 41 are
11 affected by water intrusion?

12 MS. FOUNDS: When we were looking at
13 records, there were several as to activities in each
14 of the bunkers. There were two identified of all the
15 bunkers that had some water in them, and it was
16 Phillips Laboratory's, and they own it for their
17 purposes, so there were only at that time identified
18 that there were two.

19 We went through several of the bunkers in
20 terms of looking at them for part of our evaluation
21 criteria, and the ones that we went through were in
22 good shape, but again, to make these things
23 operational, we would have to look at some of those
24 criteria.

25 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Do you know what the

1 causes of the water intrusion in the two were? Is it
2 water source? Is it flaws, engineering flaws, or
3 cracks in the facility, or why is it and how is it
4 that the water came in? The obvious follow-up is how
5 do you know that there won't be similar problems in
6 any or all of the other 39?

7 MS. FOUNDS: Again, it was sort of my
8 understanding that this was from some rain events, and
9 it could have been either around the doors out there
10 and things like that, but anyway, this would have to
11 be considered before they were made operational and
12 certified for operation.

13 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Let me ask the
14 specific question, has there been any study of what
15 the cause of the water intrusion in the two was?

16 MS. FOUNDS: No, there has not that I know
17 of.

18 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: I guess I have
19 probably one more on this subject, and then I will let
20 some other folks in. One of the issues that a lot of
21 us are concerned about when it comes to pits, wherever
22 they are, is the availability of not only local and
23 state inspection of these facilities but international
24 inspection.

25 A lot of concern about pits both here and in

1 Russia and in other places is folks want to know how
2 they are handled to make sure they are not being
3 misused, reused, put back in because these are, after
4 all, supposed to be surplus pits that are not supposed
5 to be for weapons anymore.

6 MS. FOUNDS: They are supposed to be what
7 pits?

8 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Surplus pits. Pantex
9 is a CERCLA site, but Sandia isn't yet. The question
10 though is how would international inspection be
11 accommodated at the Manzano site, that is both at
12 presidential directive in terms of the
13 nonproliferation policy, and it is also something the
14 rest of us are interested in, so I am interested in
15 knowing how the access and accessibility of the site
16 would be for international inspection.

17 MS. FOUNDS: In terms of that, at Pantex,
18 the pits themselves are not inspectable, and that is
19 something that the storage PEIS is really looking at
20 in the long term. We did not look at that for the
21 near term because, of course, you are going to have to
22 meet certain criteria for the inspectability of that
23 material at that time, but we did not look at that as
24 part of the interim storage process.

25 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: So you don't know

1 among the five sites which you have shown if there are
2 advantages or disadvantages from an international
3 inspection standpoint?

4 MS. FOUNDS: As I said, again, that was not
5 something we evaluated as part of the site selection
6 process. We are doing this for interim storage, and
7 the pits are not inspectable, if I could say in that
8 time period, so it is really the long-term storage and
9 ultimate disposition that is looking at those in those
10 kinds of issues.

11 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Just to be clear, the
12 pits, for whatever interim period of time they are at
13 whatever facility they are, need to be inspectable.
14 That doesn't necessarily mean that somebody can come
15 in and physically look at the pits. There are ways
16 that pits can be inspected without physically being
17 able to require to divulge the shapes and those kinds
18 of things.

19 So as an affirmative statement, and one of
20 the many flaws in this document, from my standpoint,
21 is the fact that it doesn't evaluate that issue, does
22 not set up at any and all of the possible sites
23 inspection criteria as a serious flaw, and I would
24 also argue that the policy of the United States set by
25 the president is that surplus materials, these are

1 surplus --

2 MS. FOUNDS: These are not yet surplus.

3 They are not considered that at this time.

4 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: We will get to that

5 one -- are supposed to be subject to international

6 inspection.

7 MS. FOUNDS: I do want to make the point

8 that they are not surplus and are not considered that

9 this time. That is something that will be taken up as

10 part of the stockpile stewardship and management and

11 the storage and disposition. These are considered

12 materials that are part of the Department's needs and

13 have not been declared surplus at this point.

14 Also, just to -- as part of the selection
15 criteria, again, just going back, that was not part of
16 our selection criteria, but we will take your comment
17 as part of the record.

18 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Just to clarify, I
19 think it is legitimate to have varying selection
20 criteria that go into less detail, but part of what an
21 Environmental Impact Statement is required to do by
22 law is to also evaluate the environmental impacts, so
23 you could use potentially certain criteria to select
24 the sites, but once you have selected them, whether it
25 is Manzano, Nevada, Pantex, et cetera, you need to

1 look at the environmental consequences.

2 Part of the consequences, both environmental
3 because inspection is going to be important from not
4 only an international, but frankly from a national
5 confidential standpoint, is the availability and the
6 accessibility and how inspection could work.

7 On the face of it, it seems to me, knowing
8 something about all the five sites which you are
9 looking at, that there are differing ways, at some
10 sites, it would be easier to have international
11 inspection, and some would be more difficult, and I
12 think that should be analyzed.

13 MS. FOUNDS: We will take that as a comment.

14 MS. BERGMAN: Do we have other people who
15 would like to ask any questions or comments?

16 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: I just have a
17 clarifying question. What is the maximum number of
18 years that would be considered interim?

19 MS. FOUNDS: Our EIS has said that we are
20 looking at a ten-year period at the Pantex site.
21 Interim really means until decisions can be made in
22 the storage and disposition PEIS, so at this time, I
23 don't have a cutoff date for what interim would be,
24 but those are the documents that would decide for
25 long-term storage. The ROD for storage and

1 disposition is scheduled to be out again until the
2 December time frame and for the stockpile stewardship
3 in the August time frame.

4 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: If these pits become
5 declared as surplus and therefore not valuable and
6 would need to be eliminated, would there be -- I want
7 to be sure that they are not going to end up -- that
8 Manzano Mountain is not going to end up as a nuclear
9 waste dump. We don't need it in Albuquerque.

10 MS. FOUNDS: Again, there is a storage and
11 disposition programmatic EIS that is considering ways
12 to dispose of the plutonium, and they have various
13 options in there that include vitrification and
14 several other things. They consider consolidation of
15 the material at sites other than the Kirtland Air
16 Force Base. It is being considered on an interim
17 basis. Those other decisions would take over for
18 long-term storage disposition.

19 MS. BERGMAN: Let me clarify that. Kirtland
20 is not being considered for long-term storage or
21 disposition. It is not a site that is being
22 considered. It is only being considered for interim,
23 so that was ruled out as a long-term storage and
24 disposition site.

25 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Is there a reason why

1 it is only being looked at as interim and not long
2 term, or why is it suitable for one and not the
3 other?

4 MS. BERGMAN: In the long term, they were
5 also looking at other materials besides plutonium
6 pits. It is my understanding that they did not feel
7 that those bunkers at Manzano were suitable for those
8 other materials, so therefore, it was not considered.

9 Do we have any other questions?

10 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: I have lots more.

11 MS. BERGMAN: I know you do, but I want to
12 give other people a chance.

13 MS. FOUNDS: We could take about a
14 five-minute break, and I would like to point out our
15 displays in the back, and we can certainly show you
16 various videos on the stage right -- I'm sorry, the TV
17 has acted up on us, but we can do that and explain
18 some of the process.

19 MS. BERGMAN: Would anyone like to take a
20 break or keep going?

21 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Before you do that, I
22 am not objecting to taking a break, but I want Nan to
23 clarify a statement that she made. She said the
24 AT-400 was certified, and I don't believe it is. I
25 believe you are intending to do it, and intending to

1 put it in operation, but it is not yet in operation.

2 MS. FOUNDS: It is not yet certified, but it
3 is on track for being certified, and it has passed the
4 drop tests and the crush tests and things like that,
5 so it is in the process of being certified.

6 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Last, to clarify, who
7 is doing the certification?

8 MS. FOUNDS: The technical answer for this
9 thing is DOE is doing the certification for this
10 thing, but the tests are being conducted at the Sandia
11 facilities, et cetera, and they were the design agency
12 for the container itself.

13 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: That testing that is
14 being done on this new container, does that include
15 another wonderful 90-minute burn test where 15,000
16 gallons of JP-4 burn and go over the east mountain
17 area and pollute our skies, or are they small enough
18 to fit in SMURF?

19 MS. FOUNDS: I will let -- it is my
20 understanding that those tests have already been
21 conducted, so therefore, if you haven't noticed
22 anything, no, they are not thousands upon thousands of
23 gallons, but it is a burn test where they are also
24 subjected to a fire after the crush and drop test, and
25 then they are subjected to a fire also. The container

1 itself is a fairly small scale.

2 As I said, I wish we could show you the
3 video tapes, but we can't do that, but maybe what we
4 can do is send those tapes to the Citizens Advisory
5 Board and have them viewed at that time.

6 MS. BERGMAN: Any objection to a five-minute
7 break? We will take five minutes.

8 (Recess taken and reconvened.)

9 MS. BERGMAN: I'd like to ask first if there
10 is anyone who has any questions before we turn the
11 floor back over to Mr. Hancock.

12 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: One of my biggest
13 complaints about the document, which strangely enough
14 some of us do actually read it, a lot of times, under
15 the affected environment, you list everybody all the
16 way from Rio Rancho to Belen and everybody to the
17 west. There are people who live east of Manzano
18 Base. It is the fastest growing area other than Rio
19 Rancho, and this is something that needs to be brought
20 up.

21 Interstate 40 where these SSTs go right down
22 is our major corridor. If something were to happen
23 like if we had an accident there where some truck
24 turns over, that blocks the whole east side of the
25 mountain. In order to get to Albuquerque, it is 120

1 miles if you go by way of Santa Fe or whatever, so
2 transportation through that corridor is a really
3 crucial issue. Should something happen in, as we
4 lovingly call it, "Nuke Mountain" or on the highway,
5 you have created a major problem for the whole
6 southwest.

7 Also, I wish the documents in the future
8 would at least admit that we exist. Kirtland, in 1989
9 when they started the fire by accident, which was an
10 accident, said that South 14 could be the fire break.
11 There are over -- at that time, there were 500 homes.
12 Now, there is probably 750 to 1,000 families who live
13 directly east of this facility. We would like some
14 recognition of our concerns as well as the Four Hills
15 residents.

16 MS. BERGMAN: Thank you.

17 MS. FOUNDS: Any other comments? No other
18 comments?

19 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: If you are going to
20 get rid of them, why don't you ship them and then take
21 them apart? Why are you taking them apart -- which is
22 easier, and which is safer?

23 MS. FOUNDS: Which is safer is to take them
24 apart at Pantex, so we disassemble the HE, they are
25 taken off, the HE is taken off the pits at the Pantex

1 plant and then shipped, and that is the safer
2 configuration.

3 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: While we are on the
4 subject of bombs, there are also bombs at Kirtland Air
5 Force Base. I know that is a classified thing, and I
6 am sure the major can't say a whole lot about it, but
7 I'd like to hear what he can say about it, and that
8 issue is not at all discussed in this document.

9 MR. MARTIN: I think I need more specifics
10 about what your question is exactly.

11 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: My question is, isn't
12 it true that there are bombs stored not in the bunkers
13 at the Manzano equipment storage area but in another
14 facility at Kirtland Air Force Base?

15 MR. MARTIN: Are you talking about any
16 specifics?

17 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: I am talking about
18 nuclear bombs.

19 MR. MARTIN: It is the policy of the Air
20 Force to neither confirm nor deny the presence of
21 nuclear weapons.

22 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Isn't it true --
23 that's always been the Air Force's position, I have
24 heard it. Isn't it true, however, that the Air Force
25 has now, in fact, confirmed that the Manzano weapons

1 storage area, the area we are talking about for pit
2 storage, did, in the past, store nuclear bombs?

3 MR. MARTIN: I need to reiterate that it is
4 the policy of the Air Force to neither confirm nor
5 deny the presence of nuclear weapons.

6 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: So the Air Force
7 officials who have confirmed and, in fact, have taken
8 the media on tours of the same bunkers that we are
9 talking about and told them there were, in fact,
10 nuclear bombs stored there were saying something that
11 was unauthorized?

12 MR. MARTIN: I am not privy to that
13 information as far as what was told and what was not
14 told.

15 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Let's go on to
16 something that hopefully you can talk about. In the
17 document on 5-60 and 61, you talk about intrasite
18 transportation within the bounds of Kirtland Air Force
19 Base. There is no discussion here, and again, no
20 reference documents, that describe any
21 transportation-related accidents within the bounds of
22 the base.

23 I am interested in information in terms of
24 varying kinds of accidents ranging from fender benders
25 to other kinds of accidents that would have happened

1 within the bounds of the base over whatever period of
2 time you have that information.

3 MS. FOUNDS: Well, of course, on the base
4 and things like that, speed limits are controlled, the
5 drivers of the SSTs, et cetera, are instructed to
6 follow the speed limits and things like that.
7 Therefore, you are not talking about accidents that
8 are capable of causing dispersal accidents. You can
9 have controlled situations on the base.

10 Obviously, in transporting them from Pantex,
11 you do not have that kind of control as you do on the
12 base.

13 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: That wasn't my
14 question. My question was what documentation exists
15 of transportation accidents within the bounds of the
16 base?

17 MS. FOUNDS: What Air Force documents?

18 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: DOE has got
19 documents. If the Air Force has documents, that is
20 fine. I want to know what exists because there is
21 nothing referenced in this document, in the sitewide.

22 MS. FOUNDS: As I said, as part of the
23 document, we have done an analysis for the intersite,
24 and again, the intrasite is primarily based upon an
25 analysis of the types of operations, which would be

1 the lower speed, et cetera, operations, and the access
2 roads to those particular areas, so again, those type
3 are not considered dominant or capable in a risk
4 scenario.

5 Cecil, do you have some clarifying remarks?

6 MR. BLACK: In chapter 4 of the Pantex plan
7 where we talk about the operations in Pantex, there is
8 a discussion of intrasite transportation at Pantex
9 which covers the same kind of operations and others up
10 to the point where the pits would be removed and
11 transported by forklift.

12 Up until the point at which a forklift is
13 introduced into removal of the pits to place them in
14 magazines, the safety analysis reports that Pantex has
15 done have indicated there is no credible
16 transportation accident which could cause a dispersal
17 of the plutonium. The forklift accident is analyzed
18 at both Pantex and at Manzano. In Pantex it is not a
19 dominant accident because there is another type of
20 accident which could have a greater possibility of
21 releasing plutonium.

22 The only credible accident that could occur
23 in a place like Manzano is a forklift accident because
24 all of the other high explosive materials have been
25 removed.

1 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: I will be glad to get
2 to the accident scenario in a little bit, but my
3 question hasn't been answered. Just to sort of add to
4 it, there is some interesting numerical information in
5 chapter 4 about actual numbers of transfers internally
6 within Pantex. There is not that same kind of
7 information in this document about Manzano, and that
8 is the kind of information I am looking for, and
9 either you don't have it -- and so, Nan, my specific
10 question to you is as you were looking at intrasite
11 transportation issues, did you receive, did you have
12 access to, did you look at actual transportation
13 analysis of accidents, transportation accidents, not
14 necessarily dispersal accidents, just accidents within
15 the bounds of Kirtland Air Force Base?

16 MS. FOUNDS: What we really looked at is
17 sort of the type of operations that are ongoing in
18 what you say is the transportation of them. We did
19 not do studies or gather information, for instance,
20 about all different types of accidents that have
21 occurred on the base, for instance, if that is what
22 you are asking.

23 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Let me ask the major
24 the question then. Is he aware of information that
25 presumably the Air Force, but I don't care whose

1 information it is -- are you aware of information
2 about transportation-related accidents? And again, I
3 am talking about accidents, I understand that there
4 could be lots of dispersal, but accidents within the
5 bounds of the base.

6 MR. MARTIN: I am not aware of any such
7 study, no.

8 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Are you aware of
9 individual reports of accidents that have occurred
10 within the bounds of the base?

11 MR. MARTIN: Information such as that I
12 would recommend be referred to the Office of Public
13 Affairs who could conceivably look at Base records to
14 see what sorts of accidents there are. I am not aware
15 of such data. It may, in fact, exist.

16 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Nan, are you the
17 AT-400 expert? You are the one whose's been talking
18 about it. You are the expert?

19 MS. FOUNDS: In terms of this, I am the one
20 at the moment to talk about the AT-400. If I cannot
21 answer your question then, of course, we will take the
22 comment and have the people who are working on that
23 prepare additional responses to your comments.

24 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: I am interested in a
25 variety of kinds of information more than what is in

1 here and more than some other printed material that I
2 have seen coming out of the Pantex office
3 specifically, including the design criteria and
4 detailed design.

5 Are there detailed design documents
6 available -- let's go one at a time. They aren't
7 cited in here. Are they available?

8 MS. FOUNDS: I don't know if they are
9 available to the general public. I will have to go
10 back and look and see. I am assuming that what you
11 really want is the type of information that would be
12 in a packaging SAR.

13 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: That was my next
14 question. When are you going to have a SAR?

15 MS. FOUNDS: I will have to get back to you
16 as to when there will be a SAR for the AT-400, the
17 actual final date.

18 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Do you have an idea
19 when the date is? Are you expecting it before there
20 is a final out?

21 MS. FOUNDS: Actually, yes. It was my
22 understanding that the schedules for those things were
23 before the final for this document, but those could
24 have changed since the last time that I spoke with the
25 AT-400 people.

1 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: You have said, and
2 the draft EIS also says, that there has already been
3 some testing done of the AT-400 at Sandia, and you
4 have talked about the results of those. Again, there
5 is no written documentation that is cited in the EIS
6 about the results of those tests, and I am wondering
7 about the availability of written information about
8 those tests.

9 MS. FOUNDS: I want to make sure that -- in
10 the back of the document, we do talk about the
11 transportation aspects, and we do describe the AT-400,
12 et cetera, so you want specifics?

13 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Even before the SAR,
14 traditionally, and I have done this with numerous
15 other Sandia tests of transportation containers,
16 traditionally, before there is a SAR, there is actual
17 information memos, et cetera, about the result of the
18 test.

19 MS. FOUNDS: Right.

20 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: I assume that it
21 exists because you seem to talk about it, and the
22 document seems to talk about it, but there is no
23 memos. There are no reports.

24 MS. FOUNDS: There is a videotape.

25 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: I have seen lots of

videotapes. I find written information actually a lot more useful.

MS. FOUNDS: We will communicate with you on that. I will go over and ask the AT-400 people if they have any additional information that is releasable and that we can give to you on that subject. As I said, in our document, we analyzed for a Type B package shipping container, and so therefore, that is the basis for our accident analysis, et cetera.

One of the things I'd like to do is maybe at a break, we could go over the references in there and what you think you still need besides references that are in there.

UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Oh, good, yes, we can do that. Let's move on to the health and radiation exposure issue. Nan, in your chart that you showed at the beginning, you showed a couple of things, you showed the comparative chart, and you also talked about the exposure numbers. I am a little concerned about how the document deals with that issue, and I won't even go into sort of the health related things I am concerned about, but, for example, on 4-182, it talks about exposures at Pantex to workers from loading pits.

1 MS. FOUNDS: Correct.

2 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: It talks about -- it
3 talks about several things, but the rem numbers that
4 you use seem inconsistent between Pantex -- let me ask
5 the question differently. Is your assumption that the
6 levels of exposures to workers are the same from
7 loading the pits at Pantex as they would be to the
8 workers who would unload the same pits at any of the
9 other sites?

10 MS. FOUNDS: Yes, that is primarily sort of
11 the baseline there. The numbers are approximately the
12 same.

13 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: They are about the
14 same, but they don't seem to be exactly the same,
15 which is why I asked the question.

16 MS. FOUNDS: Cliff wants to clarify that.

17 MR. JARMAN: For the assumption of how much
18 exposure the workers would get unloading the pits, we
19 used -- what you see for the workers at Pantex is they
20 do things other than just loading the pits, so they
21 receive other exposures, so the numbers are not the
22 same for what the Pantex workers get and what the
23 others get. For the loading and unloading activities
24 only, yes, it is the same, but the Pantex workers
25 would also be loading and unloading weapons and doing

1 other things, and they get some exposures from that.

2 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Without going into a
3 long debate, Pantex workers could be limited from a
4 radiation exposure to just loading the pits. Those
5 workers could be assigned so they do have other jobs
6 that would have no radiation exposure, so it is not a
7 requirement from a population standpoint. Certainly
8 there would be higher cumulative doses because there
9 are other operations going on.

10 MR. JARMAN: We assumed the same workers
11 would be doing it, so we showed the largest amount the
12 workers could get. Individual workers might not get
13 that amount because they might not be doing both
14 activities.

15 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: You may not want to
16 talk about this, but it seems like the Department is
17 taking the position that these workers' doses that we
18 just talked about are inevitable, because even if the
19 pits stay at Pantex, they will still have to be loaded
20 out of zone 4 and moved again, because the disposition
21 PEIS says even if they all stay at Pantex, they would
22 be loaded into zone 12, is that correct?

23 MS. FOUNDS: Isn't that the stockpile
24 stewardship and management that says that they would
25 move the number 4, the strategic reserve, into zone

1 12?

2 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: The disposition EIS
3 also says if you did long-term storage of pits at
4 Pantex, you would also move them to zone 12, they
5 would not stay at zone 4, so in essence, you are
6 saying that the worker exposures are going to happen
7 regardless at Pantex?

8 MS. FOUNDS: Concurrent with the
9 alternatives that are being looked at.

10 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Does anybody else
11 want to jump in before I go into some other things?
12 How did the 20,000 number get established, 20,000
13 pits?

14 MS. FOUNDS: That was the bounding number
15 from dismantlement that was considered.

16 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Why is that the
17 bounding number since when we started dismantlement,
18 we had considerably more warheads than that?

19 MS. FOUNDS: Tell me what your reference is
20 when you say "considerably more warheads than that."

21 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: It is a public number
22 that the United States in the '80s had well over
23 25,000 nuclear weapons. It is also a well-established
24 number in the START II treaty which has been ratified
25 by the senate of the United States that the goal would

1 be to come down to 3,500 warheads, so on the face of
2 it, we would dismantle more -- from dismantlement, we
3 would have more than 20,000 pits.

4 MS. FOUNDS: You are talking about for the
5 cumulative amount? The projection of those that
6 needed to be stored from the dismantlement operation
7 were based upon what we would be taking back from the
8 stockpile now, and that much had to be stored in an
9 interim fashion.

10 Cecil, you wanted to say something else?

11 MR. BLACK: The issue that you have raised
12 is really addressed in the stockpile stewardship EIS.
13 However, the number of warheads or the number of
14 weapons governed by START II is not really weapons but
15 is deliverable weapons. Under the START II treaty,
16 the United States would have a number of weapons
17 greater than 3,500. That number is classified, and I
18 don't even know what it is, so there is not
19 necessarily a discrepancy between the numbers that you
20 cite and the fact that the Department plans to
21 dismantle up to 20,000.

22 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Let me ask the
23 question a little differently. Isn't it true that the
24 20,000 number was first used by the Department of
25 Energy in an Environmental Assessment done three years

1 ago, more or less, at Pantex, which was an
2 environmental assessment that said, "Let's do this
3 interim storage of 20,000 pits at Pantex"? That is
4 the first place that I am aware of that the Department
5 used that number. Is that not true?

6 MS. FOUNDS: That is my understanding.

7 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: That number is a
8 pre-START II ratification number, and it appears to me
9 it is a pre-START II number in any case, and the real
10 question is to put it in the context of the sitewide.
11 The sitewide says there is the potential of handling
12 up to 2,000 weapons a year in terms of the analysis of
13 the operation at Pantex, it talks about up to 2,000 a
14 year, although it assumes that a more likely number is
15 1,000 a year during this ten-year time frame.

16 Isn't it the case that in terms of Pantex
17 and the numbers of pits that during the next ten
18 years, there could be more than 20,000 pits?

19 MS. FOUNDS: In terms of the math that you
20 are citing from the dismantlement operations, it is
21 not my understanding that we will exceed the 20,000
22 pits. Now, if you look at all pits out there, I would
23 have to go back and understand exactly what all of
24 those numbers are, but these are primarily from the
25 dismantlement operation.

1 In terms of responding to your comment, we
2 will have to look at the numbers in stockpile storage
3 and management and make sure our math adds up.

4 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: I guess the specific
5 question that I'd like to see addressed in the final,
6 this final, is 20,000 pits for interim storage
7 actually a bounding number, or within the next ten
8 years, could the number actually be higher than that?
9 That is the specific issue I would like to see
10 addressed.

11 MS. FOUNDS: For our alternatives, we are
12 considering no more than 20,000, so therefore, you
13 cannot undertake an activity that would put more than
14 20,000 out there unless there were other decisions
15 that were part of the consolidation efforts under the
16 storage and disposition, so 20,000 is what we are
17 considering as the definition of what our alternatives
18 are.

19 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Two questions in that
20 regard, one is that if, in fact, the Department is
21 taking the position that they would have to somehow
22 supplement this or some other NEPA document before
23 they completed 20,000, that should be expressly
24 stated, and if that is not the Department's position,
25 that specific statement needs to be made in this

1 document and in the ROD.

2 Related to that, I would also request that
3 the document analyze where the 20,000 number came from
4 and how that would relate specifically to less than
5 START II levels of dismantlement.

6 MS. FOUNDS: Thank you.

7 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: As you know, a lot of
8 us have argued, in the context of the stockpile
9 stewardship and management, the Department needs to
10 analyze an arsenal much less than 3,500. The
11 Department doesn't want to do that, but we don't need
12 to get into that argument. The point is that it is
13 possible that there will be dismantlement of less than
14 START II to an arsenal smaller than START II within
15 the time frame covered by this document.

16 MS. FOUNDS: Again, I would say that that is
17 an issue that we will probably address with stockpile
18 stewardship and management, because it is really their
19 document that would analyze those stockpile cases.

20 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: I am suggesting you
21 also have to do it here.

22 MS. BERGMAN: Does anyone else have any
23 questions?

24 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: I am going to throw
25 out something, that you drop Kirtland, Sandia, from

1 this project because it is not going to be a permanent
2 storage. You should get your act together and put it
3 where it is finally going to be. Put it at one of the
4 places that will be a permanent storage because of the
5 fact that you, yourself, have said it is only
6 considered able to handle the plutonium and not
7 others, and this is only interim. Well, just wait and
8 put it where it is finally going. Get your other plan
9 together, decide it, pick a site and hold onto it
10 until then.

11 MS. FOUNDS: Thank you for your comment.

12 MS. BERGMAN: Do we have any other comments
13 or questions? Did you want to continue?

14 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: I can continue, or I
15 can also stop.

16 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: I have a question or
17 statement relating to how the sitewide and the two
18 PEISs, the surge and disposition and the stockpile
19 stewardship PEIS, are relating. We just spent a lot
20 of time working on bringing people from all over the
21 state to the stockpile stewardship hearings, and the
22 main topic of discussion is plutonium pit fabrication
23 at Los Alamos, and here we are talking about thousands
24 and thousands of plutonium pits being dismantled.

25 It seems to me like the left hand doesn't

1 know what the right hand is doing. One hand is trying
2 to figure out what to do with pits, and the other hand
3 is creating more. Is that something that can in some
4 way be tied in --

5 MS. FOUNDS: What you are talking about is
6 not fabrication of new pits.

7 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: I understand that, it
8 is retooling.

9 MS. FOUNDS: Right, so we really aren't
10 looking at new pits as you are calling them, not
11 fabricating them from new plutonium.

12 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: I understand that,
13 but if we have got pits, it seems to me confusing that
14 we would need to retool them to different
15 specifications.

16 MS. FOUNDS: It is a -- do you want to
17 answer that?

18 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: No, I want to
19 contradict that.

20 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Contradict me?

21 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: No, I want to
22 contradict her.

23 MS. FOUNDS: Before I answer, basically, it
24 is an issue with maintenance of the stockpile to make
25 sure that the availability of the weapons that are

1 considered necessary, we keep reserved quantities, and
2 therefore, in order to maintain those weapons for the
3 purposes that they were designed for, et cetera, we
4 may need to have the ability to keep the pits
5 available for maintenance of the stockpile. Then I
6 will let Don contradict that.

7 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Before Don jumps in,
8 I think that retooling pits may be making them better,
9 if there is such a thing as a better pit, contradicts
10 the intention of arms control treaties and is sort of
11 setting a new arms race, within the certain amount of
12 weapons that we are allowed to have, that we are going
13 to have the best darn weapons out there. To me, that
14 violates the spirit of the arms control treaty.

15 MS. FOUNDS: That is a policy decision by
16 the United States, and the weapons that are needed in
17 the stockpile are determined by DOD and are
18 communicated to us, and we are the ones responsible
19 for making sure we can support that stockpile.

20 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: To me, it doesn't
21 seem very efficient.

22 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: It is also downright
23 dangerous. I guess I want to clarify what you said,
24 Nan, because I couldn't believe my ears. Were you
25 suggesting that in the context of the stockpile

1 stewardship and management PEIS, the Department is not
2 including a plutonium pit fabrication capability at
3 Los Alamos?

4 MS. FOUNDS: No, that is not what I said.
5 She asked about new pits. I was referring to -- the
6 production capabilities at Rocky Flats have been shut
7 down, so we do not have the capability to start from
8 scratch at the Rocky Flats plant in order to fabricate
9 new ones at this time.

10 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: You don't have that
11 capability at Rocky Flats, but you do have that
12 capability at Los Alamos, and part of what the
13 stockpile stewardship and management PEIS wants to do
14 is to specifically say that that capability will be
15 clearly identified and clearly available at Los Alamos
16 for the next 25, 30 years or longer, correct?

17 MS. FOUNDS: Yes.

18 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Including the
19 capability -- just to nail this point down, including
20 the capability to fabricate, quote, new pits?

21 MS. FOUNDS: For maintenance of the existing
22 stockpile.

23 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: What I wanted to
24 clarify is I thought you had said that Los Alamos and
25 the stockpile stewardship and management PEIS does not

1 cover that capability of fabricating for new pits, and
2 that is what I felt was a contradiction. If I
3 misheard, that is fine, but I wanted to clarify it so
4 it is clear what SS&M does.

5 MS. FOUNDS: I was confused by what you
6 said.

7 MS. BERGMAN: Does anyone else have any
8 questions or comments? Let me just mention again, if
9 you do have comments you want to make but this is not
10 the form you want to do it in, there are lots of
11 opportunities to make comments through E-mail,
12 Internet, fax, 800 number, so please recognize that
13 the comment period is open until July 12th, so there
14 will be lots more time and opportunity in case you do
15 have more comments.

16 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: I have another
17 question. Will there be any difference in the level
18 of transparency in the plutonium pit disposition
19 process if the plutonium pits are sitting on a DOD or
20 DOE site in terms of international surveillance or in
21 terms of the public being aware of what is happening
22 with pits? Is there any difference in what the public
23 will know --

24 MS. FOUNDS: DOD maintains control of those
25 pits, and the information about those would come under

1 the jurisdiction of the Department of Energy.

2 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: The Department of
3 Energy's secretary does have a policy of greater
4 openness, which is not something I have heard from the
5 Department of Defense and don't expect to hear it from
6 the Department of Defense. I am wondering where there
7 will be some difference should be pits be at
8 Kirtland.

9 MS. FOUNDS: The information about the pits
10 will be the same. Again, that is what we are talking
11 about here is DOE activity on an Air Force base.

12 MS. BERGMAN: Do we have any other questions
13 or comments? We have got ten more minutes. Don, did
14 you want to make a few more?

15 MR. HANCOCK: I will take considerably less
16 than ten minutes so people can get out early. Two
17 points I want to make are, one, the fact that we have
18 such difficulty in figuring out what to do with 20,000
19 pits, which I certainly do and would hope that
20 everybody here is, on the one hand, glad that we are
21 getting 20,000 pits out of bombs. That is a good
22 thing, but the fact that what comes from the good
23 thing of having fewer warheads armed and able to
24 destroy the world several times over is another
25 problem, which is what to do with the 20,000 pits.

1 It is even more complicated because, as has
2 already been stated, it would be one thing to say we
3 know what to do with the 20,000 pits in the short term
4 because we know what it do with the 20,000 pits in the
5 long term. We know what the disposition is. In fact,
6 we don't know what the disposition is.

7 I have talked about it in another context,
8 so I will just summarize. I have no confidence that
9 the disposition PEIS in fact is adequately analyzing
10 or is going to come up with a possible reasonable
11 solution for longer term what to do with those 20,000
12 pits. So I think it is something that some of us in
13 the public and hopefully people in the federal
14 government will pay a lot more attention to in the
15 future.

16 We have created some problems, quote,
17 inadvertent problems, that we dare not create. The
18 dangers associated with these plutonium pits in or out
19 of warheads are going to last for a long time, and it
20 is unfortunate that we didn't have a broader public
21 discussion about all of these issues before a decision
22 was made to even create the 20,000-plus warheads and
23 what these unintended consequences would be.

24 I certainly hope we don't do that again, and
25 I certainly hope as we talk about interim storage of

1 pits, which frankly, for better or worse, is going to
2 be a lot longer than ten years, and this document
3 should more clearly state that kind of along the
4 lines, Nan, that you, in fact, said in answer to
5 Janna's question, but I don't really see that kind of
6 comment reflected in here, so that is the kind of
7 change that needs to be made in this document.

8 MS. FOUNDS: I do want to point out in the
9 beginning, it does talk about the other PEISS and the
10 decisions that are being made, and they are for the
11 long-term storage until those disposition options are
12 there, so that is the other.

13 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: As long as you add
14 the word "supposedly" being made in those other
15 documents, I might agree.

16 MS. FOUNDS: Thank you for your comments.
17 We will be available for a few minutes at the display,
18 so if there are any other questions that we can
19 answer, they will not be recorded, however, but we
20 will be happy to talk about the various displays that
21 we have.

22 Thank you very much.

23 (First session concluded at 4:53 p.m.)

24
25

1 * * * SECOND SESSION 6:00 P.M.* * *

2 MS. BERGMAN: I'd like to introduce Major
3 Martin, who is our Air Force representative here, and
4 between Nan and myself and the Major and some of our
5 technical experts, we'd be happy to try to address
6 your questions and receive any comments that you might
7 have at this time.

8 This is our only mike. This afternoon, we
9 seemed to do pretty well, the voices seemed to carry
10 in the room without the mike, but we may need to ask
11 you to use this if we have difficulty hearing you, so
12 at this time, does anyone have any questions or
13 comments?

14 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: How close is the
15 Manzano bunker storage area to the 2,000 warheads that
16 are stored already at Kirtland Air Force Base?

17 MS. FOUNDS: We looked at the pits, which
18 are in the bunker area, and you have that fence, and
19 we primarily looked at it just within the region with
20 the fence and that being the buffer area.

21 MR. MARTIN: To give a comment on your
22 question, it is the policy of the Department of Air
23 Force that we will neither confirm or deny the
24 presence of nuclear weapons.

25 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: I feel that it is



1 very hard for us to assess how dangerous this is for
2 us or not dangerous it is for us when we don't know
3 what goes on at Kirtland Air Force Base now. There
4 are so many things there that we are not allowed to
5 talk about or hear about. The Tribune years ago did
6 an article on the bunker, which if I remember
7 correctly is within two miles of the commercial runway
8 there that has bombs in it which have aging safety
9 devices. I understand those were taken out of the
10 Manzanos and now are in the bunker.

11 I question in my mind if the Manzanos
12 weren't safe for the bombs, are they safe for the
13 plutonium pits? Why were those bombs moved? I feel
14 like before there is any more projects on Kirtland,
15 this veil of secrecy has to be lifted somewhat because
16 we are much more frightened here in Albuquerque now by
17 the nuclear projects in our state than we are by any
18 enemy we can see, which makes us focus on the dangers
19 at home. We feel like the war is here in our state.
20 We have many nuclear projects here.

21 MS. FOUNDS: We will take your comments.
22 The policies of the DOD in general are not an issue
23 within the NEPA, and I understand what you are talking
24 about in terms of looking at accident scenarios and
25 things like that. Primarily, the pits are going to be

1 stored in the bunkers that are out there in the
2 mountain, and other activities that are reasonably
3 foreseeable out there are not a danger to the pits in
4 terms of a dispersal accident.

5 We have looked at what is out there. We
6 have looked out bounding-type accidents. We have
7 looked at the aircraft crash scenario for that
8 mountain, too, which would probably bound any of the
9 hazards that Kirtland presents to those pits, so that
10 is why we give that in terms of the storage accident,
11 both, a bounding accident is a forklift puncture out
12 there, and also, we did look at the aircraft crash
13 scenario.

14 We are also considering the bunkers that are
15 on the east side that would be farthest away from
16 other operations on Kirtland Air Force Base.

17 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: How many bunkers are
18 required for 20,000 pits?

19 MS. FOUNDS: It is -- about 4,500 square
20 feet was the selection criteria, and I think that is
21 nominally about 25. I am going to look to my
22 technical experts to look that up. It is in the
23 document.

24 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Page 5.

25 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: So 25?

1 MS. FOUNDS: Yes. I'd be happy to let you
2 look the page up, Don.

3 MR. HANCOCK: Yes, ma'am.

4 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Our group hasn't
5 taken a position on this issue, but when you are
6 considering environmental justice, do you also
7 consider the number of nuclear projects that are
8 already within a state? I have been to so many
9 hearings lately that I hardly have time to eat
10 dinner.

11 I mean it is like I am up in Los Alamos, and
12 they want to move Rocky Flats operations to Los
13 Alamos. They want to shoot missiles. They want to
14 dump radioactive waste in the Rio Grande. They want
15 to put midlevel waste at WIPP. They want to do more
16 -- they want to expand the Alamogordo testing range.
17 Shouldn't that be part of environmental justice to
18 look at how many nuclear projects there are already in
19 the state?

20 MS. FOUNDS: Our guidance in terms of that
21 is looking at what projects that we are considering
22 and then seeing how our project affects the local
23 area, and that is our implementation guidelines. You
24 are always -- we will accept those comments and
25 forward them up to headquarters, because many things

1 come into play when the actual ROD is considered, but
2 in terms of the sections of the EIS for the relocation
3 alternatives, we consider what our project will do and
4 how that interrelates to the standards that DOE has.

5 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Isn't there an impact
6 section that addresses the fact that there is no
7 evidence that cumulative impacts will lead to a
8 significant consequence to the people? Is that a part
9 of the environmental justice?

10 MS. FOUNDS: A part of the overall document
11 is the cumulative impact, and that is particularly
12 prevalent for the Pantex site where we are looking at
13 all of the activities on the Pantex site in looking at
14 that, its impacts to the population.

15 Yes, ma'am?

16 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: I would suggest that
17 cumulative impact part of your Environmental Impact
18 Statement should also include a cumulative
19 psychological impact of all these projects on the
20 people of New Mexico and how much people here are
21 going to take before there is some kind of rebellion
22 involved. We already know that cancer rates at Los
23 Alamos, breast cancer rates, are 20 to 50 percent
24 higher. We know that the child death rate there is
25 higher than anywhere else in the state. We know a lot

1 of bad things about Los Alamos.

2 We are looking at the rest of our state and
3 wondering if the rest of our state is going to go that
4 way, too, so I would suggest a psychological impact
5 also be part of the cumulative effect of projects in
6 an area.

7 MS. FOUNDS: We will be happy to take your
8 comment on that. I will -- it has not been the policy
9 to do that in terms of NEPA, and I believe that there
10 are some court rulings that state that for NEPA
11 analysis, you do not have to do that type of an
12 analysis, but we will take your comment into
13 consideration.

14 Sir?

15 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: All of the recent
16 surveys and public attendance in the last decade or
17 more, public opinion polls show that the people of the
18 State of New Mexico are very much in support of both
19 the Department of Defense and the Department of
20 Energy's activities, so I don't know what the basis of
21 some of these -- factual basis of some of these
22 remarks are.

23 MS. FOUNDS: I appreciate your comment.

24 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: That is not
25 completely true because the majority of the state have

1 been stated to be against the WIPP project, and the
2 people in northern New Mexico who have been in favor
3 of Los Alamos Lab are quickly losing their favor for
4 that lab since it's been planning production and fired
5 about 1,000 people from around the lab.

6 MS. FOUNDS: I'd like to take this
7 opportunity for a moment, and I don't want to
8 necessarily get into a large debate here about Los
9 Alamos because right at the moment, I'd like to, if we
10 can, focus on the NEPA analysis here at the Kirtland
11 Air Force Base. I understand your concerns at Los
12 Alamos, but as far as the analysis in our document,
13 there would be no impact to residents in the Los
14 Alamos area because of that.

15 If you are concerned about what is happening
16 here, we have done the analysis for dispersal
17 accidents and for transportation risk, and those are
18 the type of operations that we are concerned about
19 here in Albuquerque.

20 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: But you don't live in
21 Albuquerque, and I am telling you what I am concerned
22 about living here in the state.

23 MS. FOUNDS: Yes, I do, I live in
24 Albuquerque. I am based here in the Albuquerque area.

25 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Do you live here?

1 MS. FOUNDS: Yes.

2 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: How do you feel,
3 yourself, about storing plutonium pits in a population
4 center with 650,000 people, surrounded by that many
5 people?

6 MS. FOUNDS: Like I said, this is sort of a
7 personal debate, and I am not trying to get into a
8 personal debate, but we have looked at the risk of
9 doing that, and the risk is not -- is not high against
10 our evaluation criteria.

11 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: I guess the problem
12 with the Department manager doing the risk is that
13 nobody trusts the Department of Energy. I think that
14 if you had somebody independent doing the risk
15 analysis, then it would be more palatable.

16 MS. FOUNDS: I understand what you are
17 saying, but we do have specific guidelines and
18 procedures that we do follow in doing this. The
19 contractor that supports us is very knowledgeable in
20 these risk areas and things like that and do
21 constitute at least a partial independent review of
22 this analysis, and we do follow the procedures and
23 guidelines that most other agencies use in assessing
24 risk.

25 MS. BERGMAN: The State is also looking

1 closely at our data to make sure they can understand
2 the logic there and that they follow it as well, so
3 there are some independent reviews of the data outside
4 of the DOE arena.

5 MS. FOUNDS: I might also point out that
6 that is the very nature of these public forums is to
7 get that information out to you so you can comment on
8 it and give us comments.

9 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: I appreciate all your
10 efforts, but there is just such a long history of
11 deception here that it is hard to overcome and believe
12 and trust data that comes out of the Department, and I
13 am sorry that is true.

14 MS. FOUNDS: Any other comments?

15 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: What is the role of
16 the Air Force?

17 MS. FOUNDS: They are a cooperating agency.
18 In other words, they supplied us data for our
19 analysis, and they have agreed to be a cooperating
20 agency in terms of the consideration as an alternative
21 for the relocation of the pits. If I am not answering
22 your question, please clarify a little bit more.

23 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: In what way were they
24 helpful with the data? What did they provide?

25 MS. FOUNDS: They provided us baseline

1 environmental data that they had. Also, we went out
2 to Sandia for some of that information.

3 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Doesn't the Air Force
4 decide if you should store pits at Manzano? Isn't
5 that the relationship?

6 MS. FOUNDS: There would have to be
7 memorandums of agreement on how to effect that so DOE
8 would retain control over the material, and the
9 procedures, et cetera, that would be followed would be
10 DOE procedures. Obviously, the material command, the
11 Air Force Material Command would remain the owner of
12 the facility, so to speak, but we would have
13 jurisdiction over the material, the way it was
14 handled, the way it was operated and those type of
15 things.

16 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Is it permissible to
17 comment about publicly available information that
18 perhaps the Air Force officer is not free to discuss,
19 but it's been in the Albuquerque Journal and perhaps
20 could respond to some of their anxieties? Is that
21 permissible?

22 MS. FOUNDS: What is that?

23 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Is it permissible to
24 provide information as a private citizen that perhaps
25 the major is not free to provide?

1 MS. FOUNDS: You want to make comments?

2 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Yes. I want to help
3 answer that question.

4 MS. FOUNDS: You are free to make a comment.

5 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: I don't know what is
6 in the Kirtland underground munition storage area, I
7 don't know what is in there, but I do know it is a
8 couple miles away from the Manzano weapons area.

9 MS. FOUNDS: I thank you for your comment.
10 I will refer back to what the major said in terms of
11 Air Force policy.

12 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: I was just asking if
13 you are getting information from the Air Force and are
14 able to confirm or deny any of the data they give
15 you.

16 MS. BERGMAN: Yes.

17 MS. FOUNDS: As I said, we also did look at
18 some of the Sandia data, too, for baseline
19 information.

20 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Does the gentleman
21 over here know how many miles it is from the runway?
22 Is it 2 or 1.8 or 1.4, do you know, or a closer
23 distance than about 2 miles?

24 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: It is closer to the
25 runway than it is to the Manzano weapons storage area

1 in Four Hills, but it is out of the way, and it is
2 below ground, and it is extremely heavily -- extremely
3 heavily reinforced.

4 MS. FOUNDS: Any other questions?

5 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: This afternoon, there
6 was a considerable discussion about some of the
7 information related to Kirtland and what you had
8 considered and not considered and what documents were
9 available and what is not available. I guess the
10 question I want to ask, and I'd like both Nan and the
11 major to answer it, please, is if currently, the
12 Manzano site is not the preferred option.

13 MS. FOUNDS: Yes.

14 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: If the Manzano site
15 became the preferred option, what additional NEPA
16 analysis would be done?

17 MS. FOUNDS: What additional NEPA analysis
18 would be done? If we actually store the pits here?
19 The intent was to make this EIS such that it would
20 constitute the NEPA analysis for implementing that
21 alternative, so there would be no other NEPA analysis
22 necessary to implement that if the regular decision so
23 stated.

24 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: I'd like the major to
25 answer that question, too.

1 MR. MARTIN: There are some other
2 requirements that extend beyond the requirements of
3 the National Environmental Policy Act, or NEPA. What
4 we would get into would be what is known as a real
5 estate transaction, and we, the Air Force, as owners
6 of the land would require the Department of Energy as
7 the users of the land to get a real estate
8 authorization saying, "You may go ahead and use this
9 for your intended purpose," and it would be their
10 stated purpose.

11 The main thing that would be required is we
12 would have what is known as an environmental baseline
13 study done. What that is is at the time of turnover
14 of authorization -- not turnover, we don't give them
15 the land, we still retain ownership of the land, but
16 at the time we say they may go ahead and use this
17 land, snapshot in time, what are all the environmental
18 questions there, taking into account past activities.

19 We would go out and look at, for example,
20 old restoration sites and so forth. We would say,
21 "Okay, this is the state of the land when you got
22 it." If the lease were terminated at some time,
23 either not renewed or they changed their mind or
24 whatever, moved somewhere else, then there would be
25 memorandums of agreement and understanding for

1 restoration of the property based on what they did.

2 Does that answer your question?

3 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: So is it the
4 Department of Defense's position that -- since you
5 have the microphone, I'd like you to answer it first,
6 and then we will go back to Nan. Is it the Department
7 of Defense's position that the draft EIS as it
8 currently exists adequately analyzes environmental
9 impacts associated with pit storage at Manzano, and
10 the second part of the question, is it your position
11 that it adequately analyzes archeological sites for
12 historic preservation purposes?

13 MR. MARTIN: Let me answer the second one
14 first. The whole archeological and cultural resources
15 requirements of NEPA have been taken into account. We
16 have a natural resources person in environmental
17 management, of which I am the deputy director. We
18 also have someone who does the cultural resources. We
19 have had studies done on both concerns, and those were
20 fed to the Department of Energy saying, "Okay, we have
21 got these concerns at these sites."

22 Does that answer that adequately?

23 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: If that is all you
24 are willing to answer.

25 MR. MARTIN: Of all the sites that have been

1 identified, we have done a cultural and natural
2 resources survey for the Air Force base and for the
3 affected area we are talking about. We identified our
4 concerns to the Department of Energy.

5 MS. FOUNDS: I would point out that the Air
6 Force Material Command has concurred on the document
7 as it stands as a draft, and they will be asked to
8 concur on the document in final form.

9 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Concerning the
10 cultural resources at Manzano, national labs for the
11 Department did a very extensive archeological survey
12 of the entire Manzano weapons storage area.

13 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: I have just gone from
14 being mildly concerned to being outraged. If this is
15 the new, open DOE, I'd like to say for one thing, we
16 never got a written notice of this hearing at all.
17 The last hearing about the DOE weapons complex, the
18 20-year plan, two weeks before that hearing, I was
19 calling everybody in DOE trying to find out the date,
20 and no one even knew the date yet.

21 This is outrageous that you say this is
22 going to be the only hearing about storing plutonium
23 pits in our mountains. Nobody knew about this
24 hearing. You put a notice in the paper a few days
25 ahead of time. We didn't get a written notice at all,

1 and you are going to say that this is the only hearing
2 you are going to have when you are talking about
3 storing the most deadly element known to man in our
4 mountains. It is outrageous.

5 MS. FOUNDS: I want to make sure that our
6 comment period actually extends to July 12th, and
7 there are various avenues by which you can continue to
8 comment on our document. We have, out in the lobby
9 there, a poster by which you can comment by fax, by
10 mail, by telephone, by E-mail, and what is the other
11 one?

12 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: In order for the
13 people of Albuquerque to be represented, they have to
14 be at a meeting, and they have to be able to ask
15 questions and have answers to those questions. They
16 need a month's notice before an important hearing that
17 will impact their -- possibly impact their health and
18 welfare. This is outrageous what you are doing. You
19 are trying to sneak things in on people while
20 pretending to be open, and it is outrageous. I am
21 outraged.

22 MS. BERGMAN: May I ask what group --

23 MS. FOUNDS: Citizens for Alternatives to
24 Radioactive Dumping, and I have already gone through
25 this whole thing with Al. We were left off the list.

1 MS. BERGMAN: We sent a notification to
2 Garland Harris, that was the representative we were
3 given, and it was sent to the home address of Garland
4 Harris. If this is not the appropriate contact,
5 please, we want who is and where we should send it.

6 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: How far in advance
7 did you send that notice?

8 MS. BERGMAN: It was about a month ago. We
9 sent them out as soon as the Notice of Availability
10 was put in the Federal Register, so it's been about a
11 month. We apologize for that. Our intention
12 certainly was that everyone had adequate notice, and
13 we really want to know who the appropriate contacts
14 are.

15 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: We have many members
16 in our group, and we'd like to receive notice at our
17 office, please.

18 MS. BERGMAN: Could you indicate on the card
19 where we should send that to in the future and who it
20 should be sent to so we can make sure that this never
21 happens again?

22 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Well, I also feel
23 that if Kirtland becomes your number one choice that
24 it is your obligation to hold a hearing here, not to
25 just do this.

1 MS. BERGMAN: Thank you. Did I see another
2 hand?

3 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: I got my letter at
4 least a month ago.

5 MS. BERGMAN: I guess we have had some
6 problems with the mail, I guess. Do we have any other
7 questions or comments?

8 Yes, sir?

9 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: I am just coming in
10 late, but I didn't see any discussion, at least in the
11 summary of the EIS, on what further research into high
12 explosives is going to be done at Pantex and the
13 environmental impacts projected for the continued work
14 testing new or old high explosives.

15 MS. FOUNDS: In terms of our analysis, the
16 summary, you may have to go into the main body. They
17 do describe the alternatives in the proposed action,
18 and it does indicate those operations, and that
19 includes continuing high explosive operations out at
20 the Pantex site, so we have looked at that as part of
21 our alternatives in the proposed action, the
22 continuing missions out there.

23 Now, there is also the stockpile stewardship
24 and management which is actually looking at possibly
25 relocating those operations from the Pantex site to

1 Los Alamos or Lawrence Livermore.

2 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Could you talk some
3 about the scope of what the high explosive research
4 program is and what the fatality rate has been over
5 the last decade for workers who are messing around
6 with high explosives?

7 MS. FOUNDS: In the document, we go through
8 a -- it is under human health, and in there, it
9 identifies different accident scenarios. Part of what
10 is identified in there is a detonation of high
11 explosives as part of the machining operations. I
12 believe that that has happened once in the last 20
13 years, and we have in there -- we discuss what the
14 accident was and what the changes in the procedures
15 are.

16 Again, I said that happened many, many years
17 ago, and procedures have changed since that time.

18 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: So in terms of
19 research on new types of high explosives and accidents
20 involving research on high explosives separate from
21 the dismantlement --

22 MS. FOUNDS: That is mainly the operations
23 out there, and that would be the dominant scenario,
24 because that involves most of the handling because you
25 are machining on high explosives, you are handling

1 them and things like that, so that describes primarily
2 the dominant accident scenario that is involved at the
3 Pantex plant from high explosives.

4 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: So is the Pantex
5 plant going to be planning to experiment with new
6 types of high explosives as we look ahead in the
7 coming years that the sitewide is supposed to cover?

8 MS. FOUNDS: Cecil?

9 MR. BLACK: The principal role of research
10 and development at the Pantex plant is not really in
11 developing new types of explosives. That work is
12 principally done at Los Alamos and Lawrence
13 Livermore. What the Pantex plant does primarily in
14 R&D of explosives is testing explosives to see how
15 they perform over time.

16 When they bring in a weapon and disassemble
17 it, there may be a requirement for a test on a
18 particular explosive removed from that weapon, for
19 example, to see what has changed in that explosive
20 since we made it, so it is not really the kind of
21 thing that you are probably thinking of.

22 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: I thought I
23 remembered, in fact, they are continuing to explore
24 different sorts of -- the chemical makeup of different
25 sorts of high explosives. In fact, that is where the

1 fatality of the last decade occurred.

2 MR. BLACK: There's been one accident
3 involving a fatality. The fatality the last decade
4 was a Lawrence-Livermore-developed high explosive, and
5 it was an experimental high explosive that Lawrence
6 Livermore had developed, and the Pantex plant was
7 doing fabrication research on that material.

8 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: So they were
9 fabricating an already --

10 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: All research and
11 development activities, and I believe it was on -- I
12 am not going to guess what it was, but all of that was
13 done at Lawrence Livermore National Lab.

14 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Will Lawrence
15 Livermore and Los Alamos be shipping different sorts
16 of compositions to Pantex and expecting them to do the
17 machining and tooling?

18 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: I would presume
19 whatever the role that is identified for Livermore and
20 Los Alamos in the stockpile stewardship and management
21 that it will be supported by Pantex in their mission.

22 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: I couldn't find it in
23 here.

24 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: If you look in the
25 summary, it talks about one paragraph of the R&D of

1 high explosives. I presume, if I recall, what the
2 total document has is much more detailed.

3 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Is there a
4 justification for continued exploration and
5 alternatives forms of high explosives at this point in
6 time that would justify the health and environmental
7 risk?

8 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: I wasn't aware that
9 NEPA was a justification kind of document. I thought
10 it was merely an analysis of environmental proposed
11 activities.

12 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: My understanding was
13 there had to be a justification for the environmental
14 and health risks.

15 MS. FOUNDS: Sir, again, NEPA requires us to
16 analyze the action. There is a purpose and need
17 described in the document for the continuation of the
18 activities at Pantex, but again, as was pointed out,
19 it is not a justification document, per se. It is
20 analyzing those and giving what the impacts would be
21 at the site considered.

22 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: I want to clarify a
23 couple of things in this conversation, particularly
24 for the record. I'd like it to be indicated that the
25 person who discussed the fatalities, et cetera, was

1 Dave Rosson, retired Department of Energy employee,
2 who has been intimately involved with this document,
3 which is the reason that he can speak to it
4 knowledgably, but because he wasn't identified, I
5 think the record should be clear in that regard.

6 Secondly, related to that, there's been some
7 discussion about a fatality related to the Lawrence
8 Livermore incident. Nan, I thought you said the
9 fatality occurred at Pantex. That is not necessarily
10 what I thought I heard Dave say, so I wish that
11 somebody would clarify that with as much information
12 as you fully have so that it is clear to everybody.

13 MS. FOUNDS: Let me make sure of this
14 thing. We do have a procedure in place at these
15 meetings that individuals may or may not, as they
16 wish, identify themselves. As you indicated, the
17 individual who did speak is no longer with the
18 Department of Energy. Just as -- I do not require you
19 to give your identification either, unless you wish,
20 so I want to make sure that we adhere to those
21 policies. Since the individual back there --

22 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: What I said, Don, was
23 that the R&D in the main development of explosives was
24 done at Livermore, and the fatalities occurred while
25 Pantex was doing fabrication studies on it. That is

1 what I said.

2 MS. FOUNDS: It was still in the machining
3 operations, and those procedures have changed. They
4 are robotically done at this time. As I said, those
5 procedures and designs of the handling or the
6 machining is quite different.

7 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: I still need
8 clarification. Dave, you said in the last decade --

9 MR. ROSSON: I think that happened in 1978.
10 I am not sure, but I believe that is when it happened.

11 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: I would like to
12 clarify for everyone there were three people killed at
13 Pantex in 1977. If I remember correctly, two of them
14 inside the building and one of them outside the
15 building was killed, so what I would like to ask is
16 how will a document like this handle a facility at
17 Pantex that is known to be deficient?

18 There is a high explosives machining
19 facility at Pantex that has public access and public
20 parking too close to the building, and it does not
21 meet the plant's current standards, so how is
22 something like that addressed in a document like this?

23 MS. FOUNDS: I'm sorry, I am not sure I
24 followed you on that one. You are saying that which
25 parking lot at the Pantex plant --

1 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: I am saying you have
2 a facility at Pantex that is a high explosives
3 facility that the public can get too close to the
4 building, and this is something that was brought
5 before the Pantex Citizen Advisory Board a couple
6 months ago.

7 MS. FOUNDS: The public can get too close
8 via what route?

9 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: People at the plant
10 that are not working inside that building, there is a
11 parking lot too close to the building so that people
12 who are outside the building could be injured by an
13 accidental explosion, that is other workers at the
14 plant that may not be working in that facility, but
15 they can be near that facility because the buffer zone
16 is not appropriate.

17 How does a document like this handle a
18 deficient facility?

19 MS. FOUNDS: Let me make sure that I
20 understand, because I want to clarify this. When you
21 say a deficient facility, what DOE guidance are you
22 looking at to state it is deficient?

23 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: I can't remember, but
24 it was presented by DOE that it does not meet the
25 plant standards, and I can't tell you if that is an

1 SAR or what, I can't remember, but it was presented to
2 the Citizens Advisory Board for the Pantex plant.

3 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Nan, is this issue
4 that she is talking about addressed in this document,
5 and if so, where?

6 MS. FOUNDS: We are not indicating that
7 there is a deficient facility. What we are looking at
8 are the types of operations and the accidents, that is
9 why I want to make sure I understand her comment in
10 terms of a deficient facility. We will try to address
11 that on a very specific basis, and if you could give
12 me any other additional information, when it was
13 presented and what facility it is, I'd like to take a
14 look at that and see how we did look at all the
15 buildings, because we did go through and look at the
16 operations out there and come up with our bounding
17 scenarios.

18 We looked at everything from emergency
19 management procedures, SARs, et cetera, to come up
20 with our bounding accidents, et cetera, and those
21 things do look at the types of structures and the
22 workers, and in each of our accident scenarios, we do
23 look at workers, noninvolved workers, which would be
24 members of the plant itself and how close they are and
25 also maximally exposed public individuals as well as

1 public exposure within a 50-mile radius.

2 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: In theory, I want to
3 understand how a sitewide EIS addresses a facility
4 that is not -- do you just do this generally? Also
5 when you find something specific, do you discuss it in
6 this document in general, or do you turn it into a
7 generalized accident scenario rather than addressing
8 specifics?

9 MS. FOUNDS: In terms of this, as I said, we
10 analyzed it in the document. There is a discussion in
11 the back of all the different accident scenarios that
12 we considered, and then we look at what the bounding
13 cases would be so that you can get a risk analysis for
14 the public as well as workers and noninvolved workers.

15 MS. BERGMAN: I still don't think you were
16 answered. I think what you are trying to say is that
17 we would have analyzed the accident scenario for that
18 building in relation to how close things were, and if
19 it was known, come up with some mitigative measures,
20 and that would have been indicated if the results of
21 the accident scenario warranted it, and that is the
22 way we would look at it, I think is what you were
23 trying to say.

24 MS. FOUNDS: We did do a screening level of
25 analysis.

1 MS. BERGMAN: Your concern is if we didn't
2 look at it, is this something we should look at, and
3 we need to take a look, and that is why we want to
4 know which building you are talking about.

5 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Let me express a
6 concern that I think is related to this, and that is
7 why -- let's keep on this point, because I don't think
8 Nan is quite understanding the point, which is on the
9 high explosives facility and the parking and also
10 related to the gaps in the doors of the zone 12
11 assembly/disassembly bays, there was analysis done
12 related to this document.

13 However, I believe, and I would be delighted
14 if anybody here can point me to it, I believe that
15 neither of those specifics, the lack of buffer zone
16 around high explosives and the specifics of the gaps
17 and the mitigation efforts that have been taken,
18 neither of those things, in fact, are included in this
19 document.

20 MS. BERGMAN: The doors are.

21 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: The discussion of the
22 doors and the gaps that were found and what was done
23 is in this document? Where?

24 MS. FOUNDS: As part of this, what we do is
25 we have -- I believe it is scenario 1 in there, and we

1 are looking at the risks from dispersal initiated as a
2 one-point detonation of the high explosives. That is
3 a combination, and it is looked at in that discussion
4 from what would happen if you had an explosion in
5 bays, cells, and special purpose facilities, and that
6 is looked at, and because what we are looking at is
7 the overall Pu dispersal accident and what the
8 consequences would be from an accident in one of those
9 and also what the cumulative effects would be from
10 having plutonium in any one of those facilities.

11 There is not a detailed discussion in that
12 document as to, yes, we are considering a gap size of
13 so much, et cetera, but in terms of the risk that is
14 identified in that document, it does include an
15 analysis of the cells. It also includes the analysis
16 of bays and special purpose facilities because that is
17 where a one-point detonation can occur.

18 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Let me just ask one
19 more question to see if we can get a short answer.

20 MS. FOUNDS: Okay.

21 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Where in this
22 document does it specifically say that you have, in an
23 existing high explosive facility, a parking lot that
24 is closer to the building than what current DOE
25 requirements are, and secondly, where in this document

1 does it say that there were gaps around doors in
2 virtually all of the major assembly/disassembly bays
3 at Pantex that were there for up to 13 years? Where
4 are those two statements in this document?

5 MS. FOUNDS: Those statements are not in
6 there.

7 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Thank you.

8 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: What computer model
9 did you use to assess the risk associated with
10 transporting the pits from Pantex to Manzano? I have
11 a series of questions I want to ask.

12 MS. FOUNDS: It is the adroit model, and
13 that was one that was developed by Sandia National
14 Laboratory. The Department has used it in what are
15 called the DIPTRA, which is an accident analysis
16 scenario, so that is what was identified in the
17 document as the model that was used to assess
18 transportation.

19 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: In that model, there
20 are several options for how you input the human
21 population numbers along the transportation route?

22 MS. FOUNDS: Yes.

23 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Can you tell me which
24 of the options for the input of population data into
25 those model runs, which of those options were used?

1 Are there some default values such as rural is one
2 person per square mile, urban is five persons per
3 square file, suburban is 2.5, defaults values, then
4 there are more specific ways to enter population data
5 into the model?

6 MS. FOUNDS: For the population, et cetera,
7 what we used was the 1990 census data along those
8 transportation routes in order to get very specific
9 cumulative doses to the population on those
10 transportation routes.

11 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: The default values
12 are also calculated from the 1990 census. I think my
13 question was more specific in that we have this route,
14 I-40, between Amarillo and Manzano, and I am wondering
15 whether actual population data for, let's say, a
16 quarter mile, approximately, on either side of I-40
17 between Manzano and Pantex, is that the sort of
18 information that was used, or was it just the default
19 value plugged in where the default value also comes
20 with the '90 census, but it is like a statewide
21 average or a regional average for rural and suburban?

22 MS. FOUNDS: I will have to go back and
23 check for specifically the radius that was used, et
24 cetera, but I can tell you that you are much more than
25 several meters and things like that away from the

1 outside of the trucks themselves. You don't have
2 large exposure, and it is not much of a background, so
3 it falls off very rapidly.

4 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Could you give me an
5 answer in sufficient time so I could submit a written
6 comment about the values before the deadline?

7 MS. FOUNDS: Yes, I can do that.

8 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: I was looking again
9 and couldn't find it. Perhaps I have missed it in
10 volumes 1 or 2 for the discussion of the tritium risk,
11 current and proposed activities in Pantex. I
12 understand during disassembly, they have to take the
13 tritium bottles off of the weapons, and sometimes
14 there may be trouble with the valves being open that
15 should be closed.

16 I didn't see any discussion in here of the
17 number of times that a base had to be shut down
18 because of tritium release setting off the monitors,
19 and I didn't see any analysis of what the health risk
20 was from the tritium exposures that happened during
21 dismantlement in the current report.

22 I didn't see any more generalized analysis
23 of should an accident happen that allowed tritium to
24 go into a water form and escape from the building kind
25 of what the analysis of the public and environmental

1 health and safety was. Did I miss it somewhere, or is
2 it not in here?

3 MS. FOUNDS: Let me make sure that I
4 understand. You are saying that there are many
5 scenarios by which the alarms go off at Pantex?

6 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: There is a history,
7 isn't there?

8 MS. FOUNDS: From what basis?

9 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Tritium.

10 MS. FOUNDS: From what basis that the alarms
11 go off consistently?

12 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: I didn't say "go off
13 consistently," but I have heard there's been a number
14 of incidents where tritium has escaped from a weapon
15 that was under dismantlement.

16 MS. FOUNDS: I believe in our accident
17 scenario, it does go through, and it talks to that.

18 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: I didn't see any
19 accounting of the numbers of tritium releases that
20 have happened inside.

21 MS. FOUNDS: In terms of that, we look at
22 the probability of that happening, and it is in one of
23 the scenarios that we give, and I can't identify
24 exactly which scenario. If I can, after this comment
25 period, we will go through and look at that particular

1 scenario, but we do go through and look at the
2 probability in order to come up with our risk numbers,
3 and again, we looked at that and then came up with the
4 bounding accident scenarios.

5 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: How many times has
6 there been tritium released during dismantlement to
7 this point in time?

8 MS. FOUNDS: I believe there was one
9 incident out there in the cell, and that cell is
10 currently not operational.

11 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: In your bounding
12 scenario that you have got, you are ballparking how
13 many times that will happen as we move ahead into the
14 future?

15 MS. FOUNDS: That would be consistent with
16 the dismantlement. We were looking at -- in our
17 analysis of the 5,000, 1,000 and 500 levels, we looked
18 at that for consistency with those numbers as if we
19 were dismantling those, completely dismantling those
20 weapons.

21 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Do you expect there
22 to be a subsequent tritium accident where there is
23 tritium released?

24 MS. FOUNDS: Again, that is defined by our
25 risk analysis, and those probability numbers are given

1 there. Cecil -- I can go over that with you in the
2 document.

3 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Is it the usual $1 \times$
4 10^{-4} when you have already had an accident that was 1
5 $\times 1$?

6 MS. FOUNDS: As I said, I can go through
7 that with you in terms of the probability. I will be
8 happy to show it to you.

9 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: What I am suggesting
10 in my comment is really the failure to report
11 accurately on the accidents that have already occurred
12 at Pantex.

13 MS. FOUNDS: We actually do discuss that
14 cell scenario in this document, and I'd like to look
15 at that with you.

16 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Let me just finish my
17 comment, if it is okay.

18 MS. FOUNDS: Sure.

19 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: The failure to really
20 have a full discussion of the accidents that have
21 already occurred makes the public reader of these
22 documents be somewhat skeptical about the extremely
23 low estimates about accidents happening and extremely
24 low estimates of health effects from the accidents
25 that come about.

1 A more full discussion of the accidents that
2 have already occurred, I think, would have contributed
3 to a much greater sense of public credibility and that
4 which I think you will be encountering through the
5 rest of this process.

6 MS. FOUNDS: Thank you for your comment.

7 MS. BERGMAN: I'd like to suggest that we
8 take a ten-minute break and come back again at 7:35.

9 (Recess taken and reconvened.)

10 MS. BERGMAN: We are ready for more
11 questions or comments. Would anyone like to start?

12 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: When you did your
13 aircraft crash analysis for Pantex, you assumed it
14 would be in what kind of container?

15 MS. FOUNDS: You mean the pits?

16 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Yes.

17 MS. FOUNDS: I believe the analysis was done
18 on the AL-RA for the aircraft crash scenario. I want
19 to make sure that I point out that the dominant
20 scenario is a weapons incident out there, and that is
21 what the dominant scenario is for Pantex. I will also
22 check and confirm that that analysis was done on the
23 AL-RA.

24 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: In your accident
25 analysis, you have a puncture, so that is a puncture

1 of one pit container, right?

2 MS. FOUNDS: That is correct.

3 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Did you ever consider
4 the possibility that there could be more than one?

5 MS. FOUNDS: Well, in general, what you are
6 looking at is the operation of the loading and
7 unloading, and that is, essentially, the time on the
8 forklift, so in general, it would not be credible to
9 state that you'd have two punctures, two cans, because
10 you don't have that ability to puncture multiple
11 containers.

12 The other thing that I do want to point out
13 is that there is a conservative analysis in terms of
14 the ability to puncture those containers because the
15 AT-400 undergoes a drop test where it is dropped from
16 30 feet onto a spike, and we have had pictures of
17 that. That is part of the process to certify that it
18 meets those standards for Type B packaging, and it
19 does not damage, it does not breach the containment.
20 You might see a few dents on the outside of the
21 container.

22 The container itself weighs about 350 pounds
23 and is stainless steel, so again, it is a fairly
24 conservative analysis that assumes that it will get
25 punctured.

1 Any other questions?

2 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Yes, ma'am. What is
3 the fire tolerance?

4 MS. FOUNDS: Again, it is the fire standards
5 that are appropriate for Type B packaging, and at this
6 moment, I can't remember the temperatures that it is
7 exposed to, but it is like a 30-minute fire test, and
8 they are tested in serial. They will drop them, they
9 do the crush test, and then they do the fire test.

10 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: I just want to make
11 sure I understood. Would you repeat what you said
12 about the drop onto a spike in terms of transportation
13 testing?

14 MS. FOUNDS: I believe that is a -- I said
15 30 feet, right? Drop onto a spike that has a
16 flattened surface on it.

17 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Would you then
18 explain why on page 4-256 of the document it says the
19 puncture test is a free drop of 40 inches onto a
20 15-centimeter diameter steel pin?

21 MS. FOUNDS: I believe that is one of the
22 tests. This is another part of that test, and again,
23 the videotapes can show that, but --

24 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Again, to clarify,
25 because I am trying to understand what is the

1 information people should rely on, on page 4-256, the
2 30-foot drop test which you have talked about, and
3 this is a quote, "a 9 meter 30-foot drop onto an
4 unyielding surface." It is not onto a pin or a
5 spike. It is onto a flat, unyielding surface. I just
6 want to clarify what you are saying in relation to
7 what is in the document.

8 MS. FOUNDS: There are multiple standards
9 that this thing must go through, and one of them is
10 dropped onto an unyielding one, then there is also the
11 ones onto the --

12 MS. BERGMAN: I think Don's point is that
13 the distance is different between what you are saying
14 and what the document says, and we will go back and
15 double-check that.

16 Dave?

17 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: In the document that
18 was identified or accepted by the Department of Energy
19 for its container certification, and I assume you are
20 talking about the AT-400 certification, there are
21 three tests that are done. One is a 9-meter or
22 approximately 30-foot drop test. The other is a drop
23 test on an unyielding object. The other test is a
24 puncturing test where they drop it from a lesser
25 distance, and I believe it is 40 or 50 centimeters, I

1 am not sure, on the spike that they are talking
2 about.

3 These tests are done in sequence, and then
4 there is also a temperature test. Those tests are
5 done and required by the NRC for certification of
6 over-the-road transport of special nuclear material.

7 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: I do want to point
8 out that in these documents, please go back for very
9 specific measurements to the document.

10 DR. KERLINSKY: My name is Dr. Dan
11 Kerlinsky. I am with the New Mexico Physicians for
12 Social Responsibility. We heard a lot of discussion
13 in the SS&M. There is an S&M --

14 MS. FOUNDS: It is storage and disposition,
15 and that is referred to multipally as --

16 MS. BERGMAN: He was talking about the
17 stockpile stewardship and management.

18 DR. KERLINSKY: We don't have any records
19 about how these pits are going to hold up in the
20 coming decade, so we need to invest multiple billions
21 of dollars in doing research to see if problems could
22 develop in these pits sometime in the next 10, 20, 30,
23 50 years. There is a lot of discussion about multiple
24 billions of dollars going into trying to answer those
25 questions.

1 Then when we get to the pit storage site
2 when we have to ask how stable are these 20,000 pits
3 in storage going to be over the next 50 years,
4 somehow, did I miss, again, somewhere in this document
5 where there is some discussion of what the stability
6 of the pit is going to be over the next 50 years and
7 what sort of research is underway to see what the
8 long-term storage risks are? Because certainly, with
9 a city like Albuquerque, which is kind of -- may not
10 have the history of Pantex, the notion of thousands of
11 pits coming here where we don't know what the
12 long-term stability of the pit is going to be inside
13 the containers that are being developed, did I miss
14 that?

15 MS. FOUNDS: Let me make sure that I clarify
16 in a couple of areas. For stockpile stewardship and
17 management, they are concerned about the performance
18 as a nuclear weapon, and that is a key to looking at
19 their alternatives and things like that. That is a
20 little bit different in terms of the stability in
21 terms of a hazard to the public and things like that.

22 This isn't going to necessarily decay or
23 things like that. They are in these containers. The
24 containers are sealed, and there is a surveillance
25 program so that we will monitor the aging effects of

1 the pits and be able to assess what kinds of problems
2 there could be, if indeed there are any.

3 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Currently, how many
4 of those pits in storage are actually under
5 surveillance or actually looked at visually each year
6 of the 12,000 whatever it is pits in storage in
7 Pantex? How many of them are actually taken out and
8 looked at each year? Could you give us a ballpark
9 idea?

10 MS. FOUNDS: How many each year, it is in
11 the document, and I discussed this with my office
12 partner because he was one of those people. It is
13 around like ten, I believe, a year.

14 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Ten out of that
15 12,000?

16 MS. FOUNDS: What it is is Sandia goes
17 through and does a statistical analysis and does
18 present a sampling regime for looking at those pits,
19 and they will continue to monitor those things to
20 determine aging effects in terms of the stability.

21 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: What is the length of
22 time that the current containers have been studied to
23 see how effective their seal has been?

24 MS. FOUNDS: In terms of the AT-400, those
25 are recent designs.

1 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: So what is the track
2 record?

3 MS. FOUNDS: The history of these particular
4 ones, since they have only been designed in the recent
5 years, there isn't historical data to go back 10 or 20
6 years.

7 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: The reason why I ask
8 is the similarity between the stockpile stewardship
9 concern about what is going to happen to plutonium in
10 the aging pit inside a very carefully sealed weapon
11 where there's been decades of study of humidity,
12 moisture, air pressure, materials compatibility --

13 MS. FOUNDS: It provides a good basis for
14 what we are doing with the AT-400.

15 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: With all this study,
16 they are still investing multiple billions of dollars,
17 because if you get a leak inside your pit, inside your
18 container, inside your weapon, if there is even a
19 pinprick air hole, you can get moisture introduced
20 inside a weapon, and the moisture can cause all sorts
21 of problem, and oxygen, as we know, with these
22 materials can cause all sorts of problems, but
23 somehow, those same sorts of problems could happen
24 with the pit in storage, could it not, if the seal on
25 the containers is broken?

1 MS. FOUNDS: Some of those things do not
2 present a hazard to the public in terms of the health
3 risk. What they are very concerned about in terms of
4 some of those is its operation as a nuclear weapon,
5 again, to produce a yield that is reliable, et cetera,
6 so we are interested in making sure that there is not
7 a process going on inside of those containers that we
8 are not aware of, and we are pretty much aware from
9 the vulnerability studies and things like that what
10 kinds of processes go on. Again, that is why we have
11 designed the AT-400 the way it is.

12 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: I may be wrong about
13 this, but apart from the risk of a criticality
14 accident, a nuclear explosion, aren't there also risks
15 from the plutonium metal getting oxidized, and isn't
16 the oxidized metal more mobile than the metal itself
17 in the shape and the form of the pit? Isn't there a
18 flammability risk for the plutonium metal as well? I
19 thought I understood there were those two potential
20 risks.

21 MS. FOUNDS: I think what you are doing is
22 talking about plutonium vulnerability studies like up
23 at Rocky Flats and how it was stored, so we are
24 storing it differently than how they were in those
25 containers, and again, those containers were in powder

1 form, et cetera. You talk about a couple of things.
2 Criticality, there is not a criticality problem with
3 these pits in that form. Again, they are in sealed
4 containers, and we are going to be monitoring them
5 throughout this process to make sure that we
6 understand what the aging processes are.

7 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Are you saying there
8 is no flammability risk for the pits that are in
9 storage in the current containers?

10 MS. FOUNDS: Plutonium, particularly in a
11 powder form, has somewhat of a flammability issue.
12 However, in the pits, in the pit form, it doesn't
13 present that same problem.

14 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: So are you saying it
15 is pyrophoric, meaning that it ignites on contact with
16 air?

17 MS. FOUNDS: It can ignite.

18 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: So if your container
19 developed, for example, a pinprick --

20 MS. FOUNDS: It would not ignite. The pits
21 would not ignite.

22 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: If the seal on the
23 pit developed a pinprick hole or rusting crack --

24 MS. FOUNDS: It would not ignite.

25 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: -- then the plutonium

1 metal became oxidized from the contact with the oxygen
2 which it wasn't supposed to have, and you had some
3 plutonium in an oxide form inside the plutonium metal
4 pit, and if it was exposed to air, are you saying
5 there is no flammability risk and no dispersal risk?

6 MS. FOUNDS: From the scenario you outlined,
7 there really isn't a flammability issue.

8 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Because why?

9 MS. FOUNDS: Because the form that the pit
10 is in does not present itself as a highly flammable
11 issue. Also, the oxidation reaction does not
12 immediately ignite the rest of the pit.

13 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: If you drilled a
14 hole, for example, through your container, then you
15 drilled a hole through a pit, and you left it sitting
16 out in the sun for a couple of decades, there wouldn't
17 be any problems whatsoever with any health or safety
18 or environmental problems with the these stored pits?
19 Is this what you are saying?

20 MS. FOUNDS: I don't think that the
21 Department has ever considered that scenario. We
22 understand the hazards that are involved with these
23 materials and take very meticulous care of it in order
24 to make sure that we are not going to have a problem.

25 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: What is the

1 difference between a drilled hole and a pinprick hole
2 in terms of introduction of oxygen into a part of the
3 nuclear weapon pit that wasn't designed to have
4 contact with oxygen? If you have never considered
5 this scenario that, in fact, you might have a leak in
6 a storage vessel --

7 MS. FOUNDS: I am not sure what you were
8 saying --

9 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: -- environmental
10 element, what is the use of all these documents?

11 MS. FOUNDS: Let me go back to this
12 gentleman.

13 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Isn't it true that
14 the container in which the pit is placed is
15 multilayered, there is metal, there is styrofoam, and
16 there is stainless steel? We are not talking about
17 going through the external wall of the pit container,
18 and then you have got the pit right there.

19 MS. FOUNDS: Right, because even though, for
20 instance, if you punctured it with a forklift, there
21 is not an ignition hazard.

22 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: What if you had a
23 pinprick hole --

24 MS. FOUNDS: What I am saying is that I have
25 considered the accident scenario where you puncture

1 the container so that you expose that, it comes out,
2 you have a dispersal, but there is no, as I said --

3 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: What if you puncture
4 a pit, what happens then?

5 MS. FOUNDS: You have the ability to
6 disperse the plutonium.

7 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: How much of the pit
8 would disperse?

9 MS. FOUNDS: How much? I think we consider
10 about -- for conservative purposes, okay, we analyzed,
11 I believe, about 20 percent of the pit.

12 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: How would it actually
13 get dispersed from a puncture?

14 MS. FOUNDS: Again, the scenario that we
15 considered was that because of the mechanical
16 properties, it would be damaged in a mechanical sense,
17 and it would be formed into particles that could
18 actually come out of the container itself.

19 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: These would be metal
20 particles or oxidized?

21 MS. FOUNDS: They probably would be
22 oxidizing as part of the process, but it is not a --

23 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Over what length of
24 time would that oxidation process and dispersal
25 process happen if you have had a puncture through a

1 pit?

2 MS. FOUNDS: Minutes.

3 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Then how would the
4 dispersal occur? Would the process of oxidation
5 actually suspend some of these particles into air
6 spontaneously without it having to receive further
7 kinetic energy?

8 MS. FOUNDS: You could get it from the
9 mechanical properties and things like that, but the
10 dispersal mechanism, again, it would just be a
11 mechanical dispersal from the kinetic energy from the
12 forklift puncture, and it would not be dispersed in a
13 wide area.

14 MS. FOUNDS: We are fairly conservative
15 because, in general, a forklift puncture would not
16 cause a high amount of this material to be dispersed,
17 so we are being conservative in our analysis.

18 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: So if you had
19 somebody that opened up 100 pits and poked holes in
20 all of them, this kind of scenario like an internal
21 sabotage scenario, somebody was really mad at the DOE
22 for getting laid off from their job after serving
23 their nation for 25 years in a job where they get
24 picked on by the public all the time, and they went in
25 and they opened 50 of these containers and poked holes

1 in pits and walked out, what would the general scope
2 of plutonium dispersal impacts be? Did I miss it
3 somehow?

4 MS. FOUNDS: You missed that one in there
5 because that is not considered a credible --

6 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Same where the wind
7 is blowing 50 miles an hour?

8 MS. FOUNDS: That one is considered an
9 incredible.

10 MS. BERGMAN: We don't look at incredible
11 accidents, and that one is considered incredible.

12 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: But you have all the
13 security around Pantex and the Kirtland base, and you
14 don't consider that.

15 MS. BERGMAN: We need to, and that is one of
16 the things that is discussed in there, if the pit
17 storage operation was moved to Kirtland, there would
18 have to be some upsizing of the security force in
19 order to protect it, so that is discussed.

20 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: So if you are
21 transporting 8,000 pits, and somebody gets ahold of a
22 shipment -- I forget how many pits are on the typical
23 shipment.

24 MS. FOUNDS: About 20.

25 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: So somebody got ahold

1 of 20 pits and decided to poke holes in them --

2 MS. BERGMAN: You can't pop the containers
3 open. It is still an incredible.

4 MS. FOUNDS: If you can show me the bit that
5 is going to go through that container, I'd like to see
6 it.

7 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: What?

8 MS. FOUNDS: If you can show me the bit --

9 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: What is the material
10 that is so powerful?

11 MS. FOUNDS: It is stainless steel.

12 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: How thick is this?

13 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: In the last couple or
14 three years on the front page of our newspapers, we
15 saw on opened plutonium canister and a powdered
16 substance, which was plutonium, and it was caused by a
17 pinprick hole, and the comment of the Los Alamos
18 scientist was, "We don't know very much about storing
19 plutonium," so it comes a little bit out of our
20 experience as citizens.

21 MS. FOUNDS: What were the documents you
22 were looking at?

23 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: The front page of the
24 newspaper, and it was a powdered plutonium.

25 MS. FOUNDS: That is not what we are

1 considering here. Again, as I showed you, it is a
2 metal form that is about that size, and they are not
3 in a powdered form.

4 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: This had not been
5 when it was stored.

6 MS. FOUNDS: Right, that is what you are
7 looking at, and the article was very specific for the
8 type of storage operations, I believe at Rocky Flats,
9 is that correct?

10 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: This was at Los
11 Alamos.

12 MS. FOUNDS: We are talking about a form
13 where you have got it in a pit, which is essentially a
14 ball, but it is not the highly dispersible form when
15 you have it as a pit as opposed to the powder.

16 MS. BERGMAN: When was it in the paper?

17 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: I think it was a
18 couple of years ago. I remember that we talked to the
19 scientist when we went up there for a hearing, and he
20 just said, "We really don't know much about the
21 storage of plutonium."

22 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Here I am with my
23 memory again. As I recall, the incident you are
24 talking about was at the Rocky Flats plant, and it was
25 about some plutonium pieces that were stored in a

1 glove box, in a stainless steel unsealed can that was
2 put there, and they were in process when in 1989, the
3 Secretary of Energy ceased processing it at the Rocky
4 Flats plant.

5 In fact, there was a leak in that can, and
6 the plutonium did, in fact, turn to oxide. There was
7 no fire. There was no release because it was inside
8 the glove box. As far as someone saying, "We don't
9 know very much about storing plutonium," I can't
10 comment on that because the Department of Energy, at
11 least up to six months ago, knows a considerable
12 amount about storing plutonium as pits.

13 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: I don't think it is
14 the same instance because this seemed to have taken
15 place in Los Alamos, and the person we spoke to was at
16 Los Alamos.

17 MS. FOUNDS: Do you know the person you
18 spoke with?

19 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Dan, do you remember
20 this, that young physicist who said, "We don't know
21 much about storing plutonium"? He carried a mock-up
22 to a hearing we went to.

23 MS. FOUNDS: A mock-up of what the thing had
24 looked like?

25 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Joe Marks.

1 MS. BERGMAN: Does anybody else have any
2 questions?

3 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: I do, but let him go
4 ahead.

5 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Somebody passed me
6 this nice diagram, AL-RA, and this is what you were
7 telling me was the container that was so secure that
8 nobody could ever get a hole through it?

9 MS. FOUNDS: That is the one that is
10 currently used for storage at Pantex. The AT-400 is a
11 different container, and again, where did it go?
12 There is a mock-up of the container back here, and
13 there are specifications of the container here, too.
14 You have it, I believe, there on the left-hand bottom
15 picture. There is the AL-RA -- I'm sorry the AT-400,
16 and it is in the process of being certified as a Type
17 B transportation container.

18 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: It is a quarter-inch
19 stainless steel, this new one that is proposed that
20 isn't yet being used, that is a quarter-inch.

21 MS. FOUNDS: And the other one was
22 three-quarter-inch stainless steel with overpacks in
23 it, and then the pit itself rests inside of both of
24 those vessels.

25 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: So you are saying you

1 don't think it would be possible for anybody to get
2 that container open following a transportation
3 accident because of that quarter-inch of stainless
4 steel?

5 MS. FOUNDS: You are also in safe, security
6 transport trailers.

7 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Well, again, the
8 credibility of believing that that sort of container
9 would be so -- that there would be no possibility
10 whatsoever that that container could be breached under
11 any sort of accident scenario --

12 MS. FOUNDS: I believe we do go through in
13 the document and go through the forklift accident
14 which does describe the risk associated with that kind
15 of a Pu dispersal, and we consider that to be a
16 bounding case, so anything that you would be
17 considering, the multiple scenarios you are
18 considering are probably incredible, but the other
19 ones would have less dispersal than what would be
20 considered by our forklift puncture scenario.

21 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Page 5-61 of the
22 draft statement says that each of the bunkers at
23 Manzano has the capacity to store up to 800 pit
24 containers in a stage right configuration, and you
25 showed the stage right configuration in your slide

1 show. Has there been a safety analysis report done on
2 storing 800 -- up to 800 pits in those bunkers?

3 MS. FOUNDS: No.

4 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Has the safety
5 analysis report for storing pits in zone 4 at Pantex
6 been updated since I believe it -- was it the 1993
7 safety analysis report that was done at the time of
8 the EA for interim pit storage at Pantex?

9 MS. FOUNDS: It is currently being updated.
10 Tracy, can you give me the time frame? I know for
11 that one, I believe it is into Albuquerque in a
12 concurrence process for the update.

13 MR. HANCOCK: My specific question is, and
14 what my comment would be, is that that safety analysis
15 report be made available as the previous safety
16 analysis report for zone 4 was made available to the
17 public, and I specifically, Don Hancock, Southwest
18 Research and Information Center here in Albuquerque,
19 want to be noticed when that safety analysis report is
20 available.

21 MS. FOUNDS: Thank you for your comment. We
22 will interact with the plant to get those documents
23 out.

24 MS. BERGMAN: Did you have a question?

25 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: If no one else does.

1 Back to the AL-RA which is currently being used at
2 Pantex, that has an oxygen atmosphere, and it is not a
3 neutral atmosphere, it is not a sealed container, am I
4 right?

5 MS. FOUNDS: When you say a sealed
6 container --

7 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: You haven't put a
8 special neutral helium in there, and you are not
9 preventing oxygen from getting in there. It is just
10 air, right?

11 MS. FOUNDS: I believe that is correct.

12 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Thank you. So what I
13 would like to know is how this document accounts for
14 not just an accident like if a forklift threw
15 something, but a pit that has a minor flaw that you
16 all had checked for but overlooked so that over time,
17 years of storage, you once again have this perhaps
18 pinprick sort of thing going on in a container where
19 oxygen is present, so you have your plutonium to
20 oxidize over time and perhaps surprise some worker
21 when they open that canister at some later date.

22 How does this document evaluate that kind of
23 scenario?

24 MS. FOUNDS: You are talking about the
25 aging, et cetera. Again, what it has looked at is

1 primarily the AT-400 as the long-term -- interim
2 storage container for this analysis, and it has
3 documented that the procedures that we will be using
4 is to continue to monitor the pit for these types, as
5 you said, of flaws to identify any aging effects to
6 the material in those containers.

7 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Do you stand by your
8 earlier comment that about ten pits per year are all
9 that are examined out of the almost 8,000?

10 MS. FOUNDS: Yeah, I think that is --

11 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: That is the number
12 that I think are destructively tested.

13 MS. FOUNDS: That is right, that is the
14 number that are destructively tested out there. I
15 will go back and check those numbers.

16 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Are you all, in this
17 document, proposing that the pits, currently AL-RA
18 containers, be transferred into AT-400 containers in
19 this interim time frame?

20 MS. FOUNDS: Yes.

21 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: What is that time
22 frame? Over what period of time would that transfer
23 be done?

24 MS. FOUNDS: Well, in terms of my
25 understanding is that it would be sort of on the

1 availability of the containers themselves, and they
2 would be specific for the type of pits, and time
3 frames would be something on the order of four or five
4 years, but I would have to check and make sure what
5 those schedules are.

6 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Where are the
7 impacts, including radiation exposures, from that
8 transfer to be discussed in the Pantex draft EIS?

9 MS. FOUNDS: It is -- let's see. Cliff, can
10 you help me out on that particular one? We discussed
11 that before in terms of where that was handled in the
12 document.

13 MR. JARMAN: For the pit repackaging as
14 currently written down, the packaging may be
15 undergoing some changes in how they foresee doing it.
16 Currently, in written plans, they were looking at
17 doing that remotely, and so the amount of repackaging
18 would be in with some of the other activities from the
19 Pantex plant workers that you had mentioned before.
20 That is why it is different at the Pantex plant than
21 the other sites. Some of that was repackaging.

22 As plans are being finalized as to exactly
23 how they might repackage certain pit types and lines,
24 we are getting some more information on that. During
25 the final, we will be looking at the estimates for

1 worker exposure.

2 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Just to clarify that,
3 you are getting information to use in the final, so
4 there will be -- this further information you are
5 talking about will be available before the final? I
6 am trying to figure out essentially where it fits in.

7 MR. JARMAN: If they officially change their
8 plans before the final is finished, we will have it in
9 the final. If they don't change their plans on how
10 they are doing it, then it is already included. If
11 they change their plans after the final is done, that
12 is not my call.

13 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Let me say what I
14 understood you to say so you can correct me if I
15 misheard. You are saying that any worker exposures,
16 radiation exposures to workers, for this transfer from
17 the AL-RA to the AT-400 is covered in the overall
18 worker exposure analysis of operations in this
19 document?

20 MR. JARMAN: In the total, yes.

21 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Is the operation --
22 is that operation, in terms of where it happens at
23 Pantex, in terms of what facilities, et cetera, is
24 that discussed in the document, and if so, where?

25 MR. JARMAN: No, it is not discussed in

1 detail in the document. Most operations, single
2 operations as to what building each single operation
3 at the Pantex plant takes place in, the procedures by
4 which it takes place, how many people are involved in
5 each procedure, none of that is discussed in that
6 level of detail in the document.

7 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Is there a safety
8 analysis report or other document that describes this
9 transfer process?

10 MS. FOUNDS: One of the things that I do
11 want to make reference to, is the information is in
12 documents at the Pantex plant which discuss more of
13 that type of detail in them.

14 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: I am asking you now
15 to tell me which specific document that you are
16 talking about.

17 MS. FOUNDS: The Pantex has information
18 documents. They are the program information
19 documents, the environmental information documents and
20 the safety information documents, and those describe
21 operations in a little bit more detail for that type
22 of thing in those documents.

23 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Again, just so we are
24 speaking the same language, those three documents that
25 I heard you talk about are what I call the three

1 background information documents.

2 MS. FOUNDS: Yes.

3 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: I don't recall, and
4 if there are people here that know these documents
5 better than I, that is why I am asking, I don't recall
6 in any of those three background information documents
7 that this transfer procedure is, in fact, described.
8 If it is, I would like somebody who knows that to tell
9 me, because I missed it, and I'd like to read it.

10 MS. FOUNDS: We will have to find out and
11 get back to you on that.

12 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Are these documents
13 released yet?

14 MS. FOUNDS: I believe there have been
15 copies sent to several individuals. They are also in
16 the reading rooms.

17 MR. JARMAN: There are copies here in this
18 reading room in Albuquerque and more copies, I
19 believe, are going to be delivered.

20 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: I requested a set of
21 them.

22 MS. FOUNDS: They are in the printing
23 process, so if you are on the mailing list, et cetera,
24 and have requested those -- Cecil?

25 MR. BLACK: As you said, they are not back

1 from the printer yet. What we have is an advanced
2 copy that we made a copy of and put in the library
3 here.

4 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: I just wanted to make
5 sure I understood the differences between the plans
6 for the plutonium pits and the can assemblies. Do I
7 understand correctly that there is no consideration of
8 storage of can subassemblies along with the plutonium
9 primary pits? Currently, are can subassemblies being
10 stored in Pantex, and are they under consideration for
11 storage in Albuquerque?

12 MS. FOUNDS: Only as part of the continuing
13 operation, they are shipped to the Oak Ridge facility,
14 and that is where they are being processed and then
15 stored, so in Pantex's part of the continuation of
16 operations, they would not be stored other than staged
17 out to Oak Ridge.

18 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: So they generally get
19 shipped off as soon as they are dismantled?

20 MS. FOUNDS: Within a reasonable lot, so to
21 speak.

22 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: As I imagine the
23 process, then they go through a series of disassembly
24 of the can subassembly to separate the different
25 layers of metal, et cetera, so the final storage of

1 the can subassemblies, is that considered anywhere?

2 MS. FOUNDS: Not in our documents, because
3 the scope of our document was to consider the
4 transportation of those to the Oak Ridge site.

5 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: I wouldn't be
6 incorrect in assuming that there is much more
7 processing of a can subassembly that has to go on
8 before it is ready for some sort of storage and the
9 processing involved in the plutonium pit once it is
10 removed? Is that correct?

11 MS. FOUNDS: Yeah. For the plutonium pits,
12 yes, it is just a mechanical disassembly, et cetera,
13 and the exact process out at Oak Ridge that they
14 undergo, I am not that familiar with.

15 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Have they decided
16 what they are going to be doing with the metal
17 components from Oak Ridge once they have disassembled
18 the secondaries to the point that they could go into
19 storage that is equivalent to what the plutonium
20 storage would be, and would these sites possibly be
21 considered in the future for storage of components of
22 the secondaries the way we are currently looking at
23 storage of the primaries?

24 MS. FOUNDS: Cecil?

25 MR. BLACK: Can subassemblies are shipped to

1 the Oak Ridge Y-12 plant. The only involvement Pantex
2 has in those components is to ship them to Oak Ridge.
3 At Oak Ridge, they take care of any processing, any
4 disassembly and any storage that is done on those, and
5 for that, we'd refer you to the Y-12 EA which was
6 published about a year ago.

7 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: They were not
8 planning on shipping any of those components that are
9 disassembled from the secondaries back to Pantex or
10 Albuquerque for -- it is all going to stay at Y-12 and
11 Oak Ridge?

12 MR. BLACK: As far as the future goes for
13 all the stockpile management activity including that,
14 please look at the stockpile stewardship and
15 disposition PEIS where it picks up where the other
16 left off and handles all those activities.

17 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: You understand my
18 general concern is you develop a bunker that can store
19 a pit in a storage vessel, then you have got a bunch
20 of spherical uranium or plutonium in the secondary
21 components that need to go in at some point in a
22 storage bunker inside a container format. Wouldn't we
23 be looking at the potential of once we put, for
24 example, an Albuquerque bunker system into process,
25 we'd be looking at potentially in the future getting

1 more than just the primary pits and looking at
2 potentially getting a variety of others?

3 MS. BERGMAN: We are not aware of any plan
4 like that, but that would be addressed in the SS&M.

5 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: So the can
6 subassemblies would be going into underground storage
7 at Oak Ridge, or they have got a whole different --

8 MS. BERGMAN: We don't know. We didn't
9 cover that in this EIS.

10 MR. BLACK: Long-term storage and
11 disposition of materials coming from that would be
12 handled by the storage and disposition PEIS.

13 MS. BERGMAN: Don't

14 MR. HANCOCK: Reference page 6-4 in the
15 draft where it talks about permitting and specifically
16 permitting at Manzano if pit storage was done, and I
17 have several questions related to that. Has either
18 the Department of Energy -- has the Department of
19 Energy had discussions with the New Mexico Environment
20 Department about what kind, if any, of permit
21 modifications would be needed if the pit storage was
22 done at the Manzano site?

23 MS. FOUNDS: No, there have been no
24 consultations with the New Mexico Environment
25 Department on this. We have briefed some of the

1 committees on these particular actions.

2 MR. HANCOCK: Has the Department -- does the
3 Department have a position about whether pit storage
4 would be subject to a RCRA permit at Manzano or any
5 other site?

6 MS. FOUNDS: Since this is not waste or
7 surplus material, it would not be part of a RCRA
8 permit.

9 MR. HANCOCK: Reference page 6-4 which says
10 in the discussion it has about permit requirements and
11 the fact that Kirtland has an existing permit, it says
12 that new permits or permit modifications could be
13 required. Would you explain that statement in
14 relation to the statement that you just made, Nan?

15 MS. FOUNDS: Basically, we are just trying
16 to make sure that any type of waste streams from just
17 the monitoring, which would be minimal at best, would
18 be covered, and those types of things would have to
19 be, but it does not include the pits themselves.

20 MR. HANCOCK: So will the final EIS have a
21 clear statement about what RCRA permitting
22 requirements the Department feels will be necessary at
23 Manzano or any other site from a RCRA standpoint?

24 MS. FOUNDS: Can I make sure? Your comment
25 was for which page? 6-4, we will look at that in

1 terms of our other discussions in there about our
2 activities going on.

3 MR. HANCOCK: Just as a follow-up to
4 complete the loop, and I have primarily been talking
5 about the Manzano site, but the question really
6 relates to that I was surprised that the draft singles
7 out Kirtland for that on this page. The Pantex site,
8 of course, also has a permit, so the question is is
9 the similar waste stream modification, to use your
10 term, or waste stream results, would that be included
11 at any site that had a RCRA permit?

12 MS. FOUNDS: Now, at Pantex, since they are
13 currently doing this operation, it is included as part
14 of their levels, et cetera.

15 MR. HANCOCK: To make sure I understand, you
16 are saying that the existing Pantex Part B permit
17 covers storage of 20,000 pits at Pantex?

18 MS. FOUNDS: Let me go ahead --

19 MS. BERGMAN: It is not RCRA. It wouldn't
20 fall under --

21 MR. HANCOCK: RCRA waste might result from
22 those kinds of operations, but that is not saying
23 those are RCRA-type waste.

24 MS. BERGMAN: The section under Manzano, we
25 cannot be covered by the Air Force permits, so

1 whatever permits would be needed, if any, we have to
2 go and get ourselves. We cannot fall under Air Force
3 permits, so that was the intent.

4 MR. MARTIN: That question was asked
5 specifically of us, and I talked to my compliance
6 chief to make sure, and he said, "No, they have got to
7 get their own. They can't use ours."

8 MR. BARTOSCH: Waste management, Jim
9 Bartosch, Tetra Tech. In this particular one,
10 Kirtland, because of the memorandum of understanding
11 that has not been drafted yet, we didn't know what the
12 exact language would be for the Manzano area and any
13 waste that would be generated in the storage process.
14 As an example, the safety worker, maintenance or
15 repair, we put this statement in to tell you that
16 there could be a permit modification either through
17 Sandia or through some combination with Kirtland.

18 I understand what the major just said, but
19 we put that statement, and the Savannah River and
20 Hanford sites we believe generate similar types of
21 waste in managing plutonium in some form or another
22 for similar types of storage activity waste streams,
23 and they could easily add that activity without having
24 a permit modification.

25 In the case of Pantex, since they currently

1 store plutonium, they currently generate small
2 quantities of waste in inspection, in security checks,
3 in minor maintenance of the magazines, that type of
4 activity, it clearly fits within their permit, and
5 therefore, there was no statement similar to this one
6 that pit storage activity would generate a permit
7 modification at Pantex.

8 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: To follow up on that
9 helpful comment, is there a document that exists that
10 describes that analysis that you just gave?

11 MR. BARTOSCH: For Pantex, the information
12 identifies the types of waste they generate per
13 certain activities, and that information is in there.
14 In terms of their permit, they list also waste streams
15 that cover a wide range of activities including
16 storage of plutonium.

17 In terms of the other sites, yes, you can go
18 back to their permits and, again, any additional
19 documents like a notice of registration for waste
20 stream lists, and I can't speak facility by facility
21 within those cells, but again, we believe that the
22 information exists that would not require a permit
23 modification because of pit storage.

24 MR. HANCOCK: My comment would be that prior
25 to the time of the final, I would hope there would be

1 some written-down analysis that would be either
2 included in the EIS or referenced in a supporting
3 document reference that provides this explanation that
4 has just been made, because I don't see it in page 6-4
5 in the way I read it, and certainly, there is no
6 document referenced, document or documents referenced
7 on that page that provides that information.

8 MS. BERGMAN: Thank you. Other comments?

9 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: I want to go back to
10 an issue that was brought up earlier about the
11 accidents at Pantex and about supposedly deficient
12 facilities at Pantex. I think it should be noted that
13 accident occurred nearly 20 years ago, the high
14 explosives accident that was spoken of earlier.

15 The practices have changed since that time.
16 The facilities at Pantex for high explosives are
17 extremely modern. They are the only facilities in the
18 DOE complex that can perform this mission today
19 without any modification. The parking lot problem is
20 being addressed by management at the plant. It was
21 brought up to the PBCAB in order to let them know that
22 they are addressing that.

23 The door gap issue has been widely discussed
24 in PBCAB meetings and in the community in Amarillo. I
25 think that's been mischaracterized in the meeting

1 tonight. I think that is being addressed by
2 management at the plant.

3 I guess my comment would be both those
4 issues have been raised in recent months concurrently
5 with the production of this EIS, but near the end of
6 the process at the time the draft was issued, I think
7 it is unrealistic to expect very contemporary events
8 that occurred near the end of the process to be
9 addressed in this when they are really day-to-day
10 management things that are being handled by plant
11 management, and they are being done in concert with
12 the PBCAB.

13 I will further comment that Pantex has an
14 outstanding safety program. Pantex is used as a
15 resource by employers in the Amarillo region for
16 training information, for how to institute a safety
17 program, and there is an extreme confidence in the
18 safety and reliability of not only the weapons but the
19 employees who handle those weapons at the plant.

20 Pantex has a high degree of public support
21 in the region. In repeated polling, it has registered
22 over 80 percent for continued operation of the plant.
23 The discussions here tonight about the deficiencies in
24 the high explosives program, I think, are misguided,
25 and Pantex should be selected as a preferred

1 alternative in the other PEIS, the SS&M PEIS, for
2 continuation of high explosives.

3 I make those comments on the record as Bob
4 Juba with the Amarillo Economic Development
5 Corporation speaking with the endorsement of the city
6 government of Amarillo.

7 MS. BERGMAN: Any other comments?

8 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: I just wanted to
9 clarify the high explosive building with insufficient
10 buffer. I used as an example what I would ask that
11 this sitewide do which is provide to people an
12 accurate description of the state of the plant, a
13 Pantex plant sitewide EIS.

14 So my hope is that we understand -- I would
15 like this document to contain an appendix or something
16 that gives us an update on the status of the SARs at
17 the plant, the facilities and the status of whether or
18 not they are in compliance with whatever DOE orders or
19 whatever applies that DOE establishes to make these
20 facilities meet whatever standards they have decided
21 upon.

22 That is what I would like the sitewide to
23 do. It is not to criticize the plant because in 1977,
24 three people were killed, but it is telling that in
25 1996, you have a building that still has a similar

1 problem, that people can get too close to it, so I
2 would just like for this document to be complete
3 enough that people can read the sitewide EIS and get
4 an understanding of the plant and where it is going,
5 mitigation, whatever is needed, and it goes forward
6 from there. That is my question.

7 MS. BERGMAN: Don?

8 MR. HANCOCK: I have a request that is kind
9 of similar to and follows along with actually both of
10 the last two comments which related to this document,
11 and that is that not only the history of safety
12 practices at Pantex, but the history of safety
13 practices at each of the alternative sites be
14 included, because while it is not necessarily always
15 specifically factored into your risk analysis that you
16 do in these documents, from a public standpoint, the
17 public is interested in evaluating the safety
18 performance of facilities in terms of handling
19 hazardous and radioactive materials.

20 There are lots of differing perceptions on
21 the part of the public as to which facilities are safe
22 and which facilities are dirty. The most helpful and
23 objective way of having some analysis of that is
24 actually having some comparative analysis of the
25 historic practices at those various facilities so that

1 it can be identified whether certain facilities may
2 have a, quote, better or, quote, worse safety record.

3 It is not up to me or anybody else to say,
4 "We suppose this," or, "We suppose that." There is
5 some actual data that is released in unclassified form
6 so that it could be available to the public, and so I
7 would request that that kind of information be done on
8 all of the sites and included either in the document
9 or a reference document that cites that.

10 MS. BERGMAN: Any other comments?

11 MR. HANCOCK: Is there going to be, with the
12 final EIS on this document, a classified appendix?

13 MS. FOUNDS: There is not an anticipated
14 appendix.

15 MS. BERGMAN: You act like you have no more
16 questions.

17 MR. HANCOCK: I have lots of questions, but
18 I can ask them in Amarillo.

19 MS. BERGMAN: Are there any other questions
20 or comments? We thank you very much for coming
21 tonight. We have gotten some excellent comments. We
22 really appreciate it.


23 (Proceedings concluded at 8:34 p.m.)
24
25

1 STATE OF NEW MEXICO)

2) ss.

3 COUNTY OF BERNALILLO)

4 I, Catherine Leon, the officer before whom the
 5 foregoing public hearing was taken, do hereby certify
 6 that I personally recorded the testimony by machine
 7 shorthand; that said public hearing is a true record
 8 of the testimony given by said witnesses; that I am
 9 neither attorney nor counsel for, nor related to or
 10 employed by any of the parties to the action in which
 11 this public hearing is taken, and that I am not a
 12 relative or employee of any attorney or counsel
 13 employed by the parties hereto or financially
 14 interested in the action.

15
 16
 17 
 18 _____
 19 NOTARY PUBLIC
 20 CCR License Number: 71
 21 Expires: 12/31/96
 22
 23
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