REC'D 1540
TO | CODE
FILE
RET. 1540

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ UNCLASSIFIED

UNIQUE DOCUMENT SAC200118480000

NOTES ON THE EOD RENDER SAFE PROCEDURE OF WEAPON #4
(W28 #45345) NEAR PALOMARES
SPAIN

1. On March 16, when W. E. Griffith and AF EOD Sergeants Grimmet and Nowak went aboard ship to identify underwater pictures of the weapon, the Navy EOD personnel expressed their concern and lack of knowledge of the EOD procedure for the B28 FI to the two Sergeants. At that time the Navy EOD personnel did not have the EODL 62-29 or equivalent, the EOD procedure for the Mk 28 bomb.

2. On March 18, a TWX was sent from ALO to CNO for Adm. Guest requesting consideration of minimum render safe procedures (everything short of nuclear system breakdown) subject to judgment of the on-scene commander. Also requested was no further disassembly prior to shipment to Pantex. This request was originated in 1540.

3. Also on March 18, another TWX was sent from ALO to CNO recommending a metal container filled with one-foot of dry sand be used to contain the weapon and a sufficient amount of sand to cover the weapon. This was to prevent pyrophoric action and contain any contaminated liquid. The message idea was originated in ALO and coordinated with 1540 and LASL.

4. On March 21 or 22, a message from Gen. Wilson to Adm. Guest stated that the minimum procedures (2 above) were concurred with, that per his responsibilities he wished to be present when the weapon was lifted and would be accompanied by Lt. Col. Neal of DNS, Mr. Asselin of Sandia Corporation, and two members of his EOD team. He stated "they will be available to assist in making inspection, render safe, and packaging."

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY DECLASSIFICATION REVIEW
1ST REVIEW-DATE: 6/19/9
DETERMINATION (CIRCLE NUMBER(S))
AUTHORITY: FOIA CHGRD
NAME: BUTLER/JCS
2. CLASSIFICATION RETAINED
2. CLASSIFICATION CHANGED TO:
3. CONTAINS NO DOE CLASSIFIED INFO
2ND REVIEW-DATE: 1/6/97
4. COORDINATE WITH:
AUTHORITY:
NAME:
5. CLASSIFICATION CANCELED
6. CLASSIFIED INFO BRACKETED
7. OTHER (SPECIFY): USAF ltr 5/1/90

RESTRICTED DATA
This document contains Restricted Data as defined in the Atomic Energy Act of 1954. Unauthorized disclosure subject to Administrative and Criminal sanctions.

~~GROUP 1 - Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification~~

Redacted Copy
COPY
UNCLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Attch 11
1V.1642
97SA20000190

5. Upon my arrival, March 22, Gen. Wilson asked me to prepare a message describing pertinent methods to be used during the render safe and packaging. It was sent out March 23. Its opening line was "Subject to modifications as developments progress, the following procedures are recommended during shipboard weapon handling." It covered such things as draining the weapon, placing it on a sand bed in the container, rendering safe on the sand bed, decontamination of clothes and adjacent deck areas as required, covering only the warhead with sand for shipment, extensive photo coverage required to provide maximum information for future development of weapon safety features, and alterations to the remains to be kept to a minimum within the limitations of safety. Its last line was "This message is concurred in by Lt. Col. Neal, DNS, and Mr. Asselin, Sandia Corporation."

6. Later on March 23, Gen. Wilson and Adm. Guest met and apparent agreement was made with the contents of the two messages (4 and 5 above). The two AF EOD Sergeants, Nowak and Grimmet, were put aboard the USS Hoist, the designated recovery vessel, along with the container and 16 drums of dry beach sand. It was not known at that time exactly what their role would be.

7. On March 30, Col. Neal and myself met with LCDR Moody, the Navy EOD officer in charge, and his assistant, Lt. Funston, aboard the USS Hoist. The Hoist top officers were also present. LCDR Moody asked me to consider some changes to the original plan (5 above). He wanted to put the weapon on wooden chocks and let it drain on the deck, then perform the RSP in that condition. He said the deck could easily be washed down if contaminated. After ascertaining that the container and the sand would be readily available in case of need, I agreed.

Col. Neal agreed also. Moody also suggested that if the item was in good shape, that they should only pull the battery prior to the press look-see and do further RSP and disassembly later. Col. Neal and I also agreed to this. The role of the AF EOD Sergeants was still not clear at this time, although we were given the impression their role would be an active one.

8. On April 7, the weapon was lifted aboard the USS Petrel. Sgt. Nowak worked with Navy Lt. Anderson on the RSP logging function. Sgt. Grimmet worked with Navy Lt. Funston and one Navy enlisted man in the battery removal procedure. Lt. Funston took the most active role in this operation. LCDR Moody acted in an overseeing and advising role. Col. Neal and I observed and when the problem of the stuck battery came up, I was asked the nature of the battery structure and the possibility of getting an attachment point by drilling in.

DOE
b(3)

The total number of Navy EOD personnel involved was approximately ten enlisted and three officers. This included three or four divers who tied additional lines to the bomb before it was brought aboard.

9. On April 8 after the press review, the remaining teardown took place. Lt. Funston was in charge at this point, with LCDR Moody absent. An additional participant was Navy Lt. Huntsinger from the Indian Head EOD facility. Lt. Funston announced that the operation would be run on a team basis with one Navy and one

Air Force man consisting of a team for a particular task with the rest helping when needed. It soon evolved into everyone participating equally with no particular confusion resulting.

DOE b(3)

My first reaction was to tell him it was his right, but he was facing a problem in the facilities for doing so and the packaging facilities.

A short time later Lt. Col. Neal talked to Lt. Funston and gave his opinion that a lot more would be gained for future development by leaving the assembly intact for analysis and he didn't see that there was any particular danger involved. I then stated that I was there strictly in an advisory role but I recommended that it be sent back intact so that the only people who could really analyze the material (LASL) could observe the teardown. He then asked me which way I recommended it go and I stated "the way it is." Then he said "that's the way it will go." LCDR Moody arrived later and agreed with this decision.

The idea to investigate the pressure valve in the rear end cap bolt of the warhead was my own, and subsequent action resulted from discussion among LCDR Moody, Lt. Col. Neal, and myself.

10. I observed the packaging of the bomb, and my recommendations for placement of the parts were followed.

Upon arriving aboard the Petrel that morning, I had heard from the EOD personnel from the Cascade that a deep hold, ventilated through the ships system, was to be used for storing the bomb in its container. Since this sounded bad from a

ventilation standpoint, I went to the Cascade accompanied by one of the Cascade EOD technicians (Miller). This trip was OK'd by Lt. Funston. I met with Captain Birdt, Exec. CDR Burgo, and weapons officer Lt. Hall. CDR Burgo showed me the planned shipment position, on a high deck outdoors, where the container would be easily secured down, and easily guarded. Captain Birdt asked me about the packaging method and weapon condition. I explained the reasons for the sand package and what the sand was designed to protect and gave my opinion as to the excellent condition of the weapon remains.

When the package was completed, and prior to transfer from the Petrel to the Cascade, LCDR Moody asked that I certify the weapon safe for shipment, along with himself and Lt. Col. Neal, on the shipping document. They did and I did.

S. F. Asselin
4-15-66

This is an exact copy:08/19/96:12331:csp
MS1371 R. H. Steele, 10105

This is an exact copy: 06/03/97: 7447: cmg.
Distribution:
M0659A Elva Barfield, FOIA Officer/OPA; DOE/AL